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1. Introduction 
 
This paper is a contribution to discussions on the possible impact of global crises, especially the 
current financial crisis, on the economic and social rights of Palestinian refugees in host Arab 
countries. This paper will be limited to discussing the case of Palestinian refugees in Arab states 
that host the majority of Palestinian refugees1 (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria2), but recognizes 
that the impact of such crises reaches beyond refugees, to citizens and other legal and illegal 
migrants. 
Palestinian refugees constitute a unique case study.3 Prolonged exile, statelessness, and Israeli 
refusal re-admit refugees render their situation extraordinary and unique. Therefore this study and 
others on Palestinian refugees may not build on conclusions reached in other refugee case 
studies, and the conclusions reached may not necessarily be applicable in other circumstances, 
even if in apparently similar experiences. This may explain the large number of studies related to 
Palestinian refugees,4 including those focusing on their legal status and the rights and freedoms 
                                               
1 Approximately half of all refugees worldwide are Palestinian (Badil 2007, 42; Zureik 2001, 206), most have not acquired the 
nationality of host or third countries (with the exception of Palestinians in Jordan), and thus are stateless. Statelessness is a key 
concern for more than half the global Palestinian population (Hammami and Johnson 1999, 316). According to Shiblak (2006, 8), 
Palestinians are the largest stateless community in the world. According to the latest statistics from the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA), there are 4,671,811 registered Palestinian refugees (1,373,732 are registered in camps), distributed in 
UNRWA areas of operation as follows: 1,951,603 in Jordan, 422,188 in Lebanon, 461,897 in Syria, 762,820 in the West Bank and 
1,073,303 in the Gaza Strip. Those figures are published at the UNRWA website: www.un.org/unrwa/publications/index.html (visited 
on 23 December 2009). Registered Palestinian refugees can be counted. Those refugees, who, for various reasons, did not register, 
are practically impossible to count. Some estimate their number to be 1.3 million (Said 2005, 350). A related issue is that of 
undocumented Palestinian refugees. These are particularly vulnerable in that they are not registered by UNRWA (thus not entitled to 
their services) but also are not registered by a host country. They do not have any paper documentation and are invisible (legally 
speaking). For more about the undocumented Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, see Petrigh (2006). As for Egypt, the number of 
Palestinian refugees is estimated to be between 50,000 and 70,000. According to Takkenberg (1998, 150-154), the total number of 
Palestinians in Egypt may amount to between 50,000 and 100,000. Many are estimated to be illegally resident. I am not aware of 
the existence of any official statistics related to Palestinian refugees in Egypt, whether those registered or undocumented. For more 
about Palestinian in Egypt, see: El-Abed (2004). 
2 The selection of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria is justified by the simple fact of their being, with the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, the main destinations for Palestinian refugees during 1948 war (the nakba). They are the four countries adjacent to historical 
Palestine, and the places where most Palestinian refugees are still living and where most refugee camps are present. Those 
countries also have a variety of legal accommodations for Palestinian refugees that satisfy the objectives of the research. The legal 
status, rights, and freedoms of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not covered in this paper for two reasons. 
Firstly, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are occupied territories and as such, territories where International Humanitarian Law applies, 
making the legal status and rights’ distribution map totally different from that of host Arab states. Secondly, Palestinian refugees and 
non-refugees fell under Israeli occupation in 1967 and were treated alike with regards to residency status. They are even treated 
alike under the Palestinian Authority, with regards to political, civil, economic and social rights. The only difference is the entitlement 
of registered Palestinian refugees to services provided by UNRWA, which will be indirectly referred to later, under the issue of 
UNRWA and the impact of current crisis on it.  
3 Palestinian refugees fall, grosso modo, into three general categories. The largest group is composed of those displaced or 
expelled from their place of origin as a result of the nakba. The second major group is made up of those displaced for the first time 
from their places of origin as a result of the 1967 war. The last category includes Palestinians who are neither 1948 nor 1967 
refugees, but who dwell outside the area of the former Palestine and are unable (due to revocation of residency, denial of family 
reunification, and deportation) or unwilling to return owing to a well-founded fear of persecution (Badil 2007, 42). However, it should 
be noted that not all the above categories are deemed refugees, legally speaking, whether according to international law, to 
international organizations’ operational definition, or for domestic law of host state (Khalil 2009, 2). A legal definition is inevitably a 
narrower one. Accordingly, only those enjoying the status of refugee in the strict legal sense enjoy the rights guaranteed by 
international law and included in many national laws and regulations (Grabska 2006, 9-10). 
4 The bibliography, although not exhaustive, includes a large number of available resources, mostly related to legal status, rights, 
and freedoms in host Arab states.  
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they enjoy in host countries.5 This focus fits largely within broader global interest in issues related 
to refugees, especially their role under international law.6 For this reason, this paper also contains 
some general arguments that may apply to other refugees in the concerned countries, or in other 
parts of the world.7 Interest in the legal status of Palestinian refugees goes beyond the concerned 
states, and beyond Palestinian refugees themselves, and there are cases in which countries need 
to take concrete decisions as to whether or not to grant Palestinians asylum status or not.8  
This paper distinguishes between legal recognition of economic and social rights and political 
enforcement. It may rightly be argued that, grosso modo, huge steps have been taken in the legal 
recognition of economic and social rights since World War II, and especially in the last two 
decades, on the international and national level, particularly with regard to the codification of these 
rights in constitutional texts of the expansion of rigid and written constitutions (Saiz 2009, 277-278).  
Legal recognition does not necessarily mean political enforcement, which is often subject to 
available resources and may reflect a misconception of economic and social rights by state 
authorities that may not consider them real legal rights, but rather as political or moral aspirations. 
An analysis of concrete steps taken to deal with the current global crisis shows that economic and 
                                               
5 If this is the case, one may contend, then why another study about Palestinian refugees? This is a valid concern, since there is 
indeed a very rich literature on this issue and the status of Palestinian refugees in host states; in a sense, the topic is over-
researched rather than under-researched, to the point of being sometimes repetitive. Most importantly, this concern is legitimate 
because the legal position of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states largely depends more on administrative practices that are 
subject to constant change. Accordingly, as outlined by Takkenberg (1998, 133, 150) any information collected on the issue is only 
indicative, being subject to continuous verification and update. Why then bother writing on a topic that may be soon outdated? I 
believe the objections in themselves justify somehow this additional research in that they insinuate that there is a need to a 
systematic approach to issues related to Palestinian refugees in Arab states in a way that facilitates access to information and, most 
importantly, that there is need for continuous update on the legal status of Palestinian refugees in the Arab world. This paper, as 
much as an earlier version of this study (Khalil 2009), is a contribution in that direction.   
6 The current international system is based on sovereign states. A state’s sovereignty is challenged by refugees, which force 
international actors to consider ethical principles and issues of human rights, which are part of their international obligations 
(Rempel 2006, 7). In fact, based on the principle of non-refoulement (i.e. This principle is part of customary international law and 
was embodied in 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 33, para.1: “No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”) sovereign states cannot refuse to admit refugees into their 
territory, based on regulations applicable on foreign nationals. A refugee, indeed, is a foreign national but he or she cannot be 
subjected to all the regulations applicable to foreign nationals, since his or her status, as a refugee, is by definition related to the 
coercive departure from the country of origin. 
7 However, the interest in the issue of Palestinian refugees, besides their large numbers and long years of refugeehood, is justified 
largely by the fact that large numbers of those refugees are stateless (thus, practically, they have no other country where they can 
return or at least, not other documents that enables them to reside legally in another country, although theoretically they have the 
right of return to their country of origin). Accordingly, their refugeehood becomes a source of instability, insecurity, and risk, for both 
the country of first refuge and the third states, which are a possible target of refugee migratory tendency. As pointed out by Shiblak 
(2006, 9), statelessness is a push factor leading to massive irregular migration. Around eighty percent of the 80,000 stateless 
Palestinians thought to be in Germany hold refugee travel documents from Lebanon. He then concluded: “[t]here is a clear 
correlation between statelessness and asylum seeking in industrialized countries. The large numbers of stateless people from the 
region … illustrate the strength of determination to escape the humiliation and uncertainty that statelessness brings. … They sought 
asylum in Europe when their residency status in the host countries became increasingly insecure and, in most cases, they were 
denied the right to go back to these countries.” 
8 This was the central point around which the brief amicus curie to the United States Board of Immigration Appeals, the highest 
appellate administrative system governing immigration decisions in the United States, including decisions concerning refugees and 
asylum seekers (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 185). The cases related to an unmarried Palestinian, and a Palestinian 
couple, holding refugee travel documents issued by Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. They were working in Saudi Arabia with work 
visas. They travelled to the United States for vacation and when they tried to return, they were denied access by Saudi Arabian 
authorities while not being able to enter the country that issued their travel document or any other country. In both cases, the 
Palestinians requested political asylum, which was initially denied but later granted. Similar cases may arise in other countries. 
According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs and The Centre for Lebanese Studies (2002, 11), “many Palestinians who 
have found asylum in the West have not been recognized as refugees.” 
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social rights are still treated by most governments as rhetorical aspirations rather than binding 
principles of public policy. Simultaneously, human rights remain absent from public debate as 
regards the impact of the crisis (Saiz 2009, 280).  
The four countries of concern here have ratified many international human rights conventions,9 and 
have included many protections in their constitutions.10 However, to say that this is a positive step 
does not mean that, legally speaking, international treaties really matter within national legal 
systems, and, more importantly, that constitutions really matter.11 Constitutions may only be façade 
constitutions, and international treaties, as part of international law, often lack enforcement 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is possible to confirm that having international and constitutional 
recognition helps to individualize the standards to which concerned states may aspire or may be 
aspiring to in the future, and that can accordingly be tested to judge state authority performance.12 
The impact of the financial crisis on the political enforcement of economic and social rights, as 
regards the lack of legal accountability, is easily shown13 and can be measured in short and 
medium terms. More subtle is the observation of the impact of the recession in the legal recognition 
of economic and social rights, which can be reflected, in extrimis, through changes in positive law. 
This applies to changes in the statutes, such as constitutional texts, acts of the parliament, and 
other secondary legislation for countries with civil law systems, but can also appear through 
changes in case law. 
Changes in the legal recognition of economic and social rights are nearly impossible to prove in the 
short or even medium term. Only the long-term observation of legislation and cases can inform 
conclusions. It requires subtlety and sophistication to demonstrate that this specific legal change is 
due to that specific crisis. To do so there is a need for different research tools, and frameworks 
then those applied in this research.14 Accordingly, any research pretending to show, through 
inappropriate methodological tools, a cause-consequence relationship between the global financial 
                                               
9 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
were ratified by all concerned countries, Egypt in 1982, Jordan in 1975, Syria in 1969, and Lebanon in 1972.  
10 Most constitutions of Arab countries are available on the website of the Program of Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR): 
http://www.pogar.org/. 
11 Although impossible to cover here, it is nonetheless possible to conclude that this is an issue that is exclusively of interest for 
particular countries, rather this is an issue that is of relevance of many countries of the world, including some Western and 
democratic countries. With regards to the way international treaties matter in national legal system, there are monist and dualist 
approach. In a country that belongs to a dualist system, such as the UK, a treaty needs to be converted first into national legislation 
in order to be applicable by British courts.  As for the enforceability of the constitution, many countries do not have the form of 
judicial review existent in the USA (exercised by each court, under the Supreme Court) or by a specific centralized court (such as in 
Germany). The typical example is France.  
12 The Committee of on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issue concluding observations when considering reports submitted 
by state parties. It has done so for example, with regards to Lebanon, in 2004 (CERD/C/64/CO/03), in which (n.12), “the Committee 
reiterate[d] its concern with regard to the enjoyment by the Palestinian population present in the country of all rights stipulated in the 
Convention on the basis of non-discrimination, in particular access to work, health care, housing and social services as well as the 
right to effective legal remedies.” The report is available at:  
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/14B690AD6762EDF285256F9300547FE1  
13 For example by observing the financial assets dedicated for social issues, services provided for refugees in one country, or 
international and humanitarian aid before and after a financial recession.  
14 In fact, this paper, although it uses empirical data in which legislation and courts decision are used as tangible and rough data, my 
arguments are largely theoretical, aiming at analyzing those data in an analytical way. I owe much of the insights about national 
legislations related to Palestinian refugees in host countries to contributions of local experts from the concerned countries, provided 
in the context of a previous research (Khalil 2009), namely, Hassan Jouni from Lebanon, Mohamed Olwan from Jordan, Fawaz 
Saleh from Syria, and Sharifa Shafie from Egypt. Unless specified differently, reference to legislative texts and policies related to 
Palestinian refugees in those countries are based on the data provided upon solicitation by local researchers to the author. All 
remaining inaccuracies are only mine.  
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crisis and legal recognition of Palestinian refugee economic and social rights will be misleading, 
and risks being scientifically unfounded.15  
Rather, this paper argues that, historically speaking, crises (political, economic and social) on the 
national, regional, and international levels have had negative impacts on Palestinian refugees, not 
only in terms of political enforcement but also in terms of legal recognition. The paper shall argue 
that there are no grounds to believe things will be any different with the current global financial 
crisis. The impact may in fact be worse, recognizing the increase in Palestinian refugees in Arab 
countries and, accordingly, the increase their needs.  
The details of this situation will be discussed. This discussion will cover what is commonly referred 
to as the ‘protection gap’ facing Palestinian refugees in host Arab states on the international and 
regional level, the lack of clear legal texts providing for and protecting basic rights, and the 
existence of discriminatory legal texts that are included in constitutional texts of Arab states. All of 
the above may explain why Palestinian refugee rights in Arab states are more fragile than those of 
other categories of persons.  
Finally, this paper argues that political enforcement by concerned countries or international 
organizations without legal recognition renders them more similar to charitable actions than legal 
obligations. In the case of legal obligations, rights hold particular weight, and states and 
international organizations become accountable. The assistance provided to Palestinian refugees 
is far from a legal obligation for concerned states. As a consequence, this assistance is dependent 
on available resources and political will of donors. Accordingly, Palestinian refugees will feel the 
negative impact of the financial crisis as donors turn towards humanitarian aid rather than 
development.16  
 
2. Palestinian refugees: a threat to national security?  
 
For Arab states, the issue of Palestinian refugees is treated as a matter of national security, 
despite a lack of consensus regarding the dimension and content of the threat. The fact that the 
Ministry of Interior is responsible of the ‘dossier’ of Palestinian refugees is particularly significant.17 
                                               
15 The risk here is to apply simplistic analysis, using syllogism on this complicated issue, resolving the dilemma almost 
mathematically, by saying that if A (financial crisis) leads to B (political unwillingness or impossibility to enforce economic and social 
rights), B leads to C (changes in legal recognition of economic and social rights), then A leads to C. 
16 Throughout this paper, two background assumptions, almost an ideology, shall appear and be reflected in what shall follow. First, 
each individual, without discrimination based, inter alia, on origin and nationality, have intrinsic rights that may be organized and 
regulated by the state. Although the state may regulate the way those rights are fulfilled, when and how, those rights should not be 
subjected to arbitrary derogation or annulment. This approach employs what might be termed a ‘rights-based approach’.16 Second, 
state and state law are central in the efforts to realize human development in general, through the fulfilment of his economic and 
social rights in particular. In this sense, the state has the obligation under human rights law, on the one side, to fulfil economic and 
social rights through the assignment of the maximum resources available to the progressive fulfilment of economic and social rights, 
even in the context of declining growth, and on the other side to respect them by avoiding to directly infringe them, and protect them 
from abuses of private actors (Saiz 2009, 282-263). 
17 The national institution responsible for refugees recognized by UNHCR is the department of Refugee Affairs at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, while others, including Palestinian refugees, fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. In both cases, 
however, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for issuing residence permits. A Higher Committee for Palestinian Immigrant 
Affairs was established to coordinate relief efforts, presided over by a deputy of the Minister of the Interior (Takkenberg 1998, 150). 
For Syria things are different in that specific institutions were established to follow up the issue of Palestinian refugees, including 
‘The Palestine Arab Refugee Institution’ that was substituted by the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees, under the 
auspices of the department of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (As-Sahly 1999).  
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In Lebanon, for example, the heated debate over Palestinian refugees often relates to community 
balance (IFHR 2003, 11; Zureik 2001, 212),18 or to the role of Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese 
civil war (RIIA and CLS 2002, 14). In Jordan, equilibrium is needed in terms of the large number of 
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin (Arzt 1996, 43). In Egypt, the regulation of border crossing 
to and from Gaza is a priority, and strict regulation of migratory flows is deemed a priority 
(Takkenberg 1998, 153-154). In Syria, the control of population movements and other aspects of 
life, including those of Palestinian refugees and Syrian citizens, constitutes a serious concern for 
the regime.19 
Keeping Palestinians in Palestine (or keeping Palestine for the Palestinians) is a noble objective, 
but when it is presented, as is the case in some Arab countries, to justify restrictive measures on 
movement or the rights and freedoms of Palestinian refugees, even if legally resident,20 it becomes 
a political slogan, void of any significance.  
In the following sections I provide arguments to support the above, aiming to show how Palestinian 
refugee issues are tackled by Arab countries not through a ‘human rights’ perspective, but rather 
through a ‘security’ perspective. This explains why restrictive measures and policies are 
undertaken by Arab states with regards to Palestinians. These restrictions often apply to those 
‘legally residing’ in the concerned country (having fulfilled conditions imposed by national law to be 
recognized as Palestinian refugees), as well as, though more restrictively, on those who reside 
illegally, those holding legal status in other host country, or those holding a Palestinian Authority 
travel document. Each category faces a different kind of treatment.21  
                                               
18 According to Takkenberg (1998, 162), Palestinian refugees in Lebanon “were viewed by the Lebanese ruling establishment as a 
threat to the delicate balance between Christians and Muslims and, therefore, to political and social stability. … As a result, the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have been in a precarious position.” For this reason, it seems that opposition to the settlement of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is one of the few issues that unites the Lebanese government and public opinion across most of 
the sectarian communities (Sayigh 1995, 37), leaders in government and in the opposition, both in Lebanon and abroad (El Khazen 
2007). According to Arzt (1996, 47), “Lebanese officials have on more than one occasion expressed an intention to expel all 
Palestinians, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims, at the earliest possible occasion, claiming that their integration in the country 
would upset the country’s ‘delicate sectarian balance,’ in which Shi’ite Muslims have a slight majority over a dwindling number of 
Maronite Christians.”  
19 For the Syrian government, the approach to the refugee influx differed considerably from that of the other host states. According 
to Takkenberg (1998, 167) the reasons behind this attitude can be explained in various ways. First, in 1948, Syria was not suffering 
from unemployment or limited natural resources. Second, the arrival of 90.000 to 100.000 refugees did not threaten the economy or 
social structure of the country. Third, Palestinian refugees never constituted more than 2 to 3 per cent of the population. It shall be 
noted however that Syria is well known for having the most favourable legal and official treatment of Palestinian refugees. However, 
as rightly noted by (Arzt 1996, 48) of all the areas within the UNRWA orbit, “the least amount of information has been published on 
Palestinians in Syria.” All conclusions reached by the scrutiny of existing legislation related to Palestinian refugees in Syria, needs, 
accordingly, to be treated with caution.   
20 Imposing restrictions on economic activity, security pressures and intimidation, non-renewal of residency for Palestinians leaving 
countries of first refuge, and perhaps even stripping the Palestinians of their legal rights altogether is often perceived as a form of 
pressure to avoid the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in host states (Brynen 1997, 49-50). This political ‘push factor’ 
aims at encouraging Palestinian emigration (Sayigh 1995, 43), and once they have emigrated, aims to complicate their return. In 
Syria, the country which deals with Palestinian refugees as Syrian nationals, it is provided in Syrian citizenship law (Citizenship Law 
No. 276/1969) that Palestinians are excluded from access to citizenship in order to ‘preserve their original nationality’. Accordingly it 
seems that Syria rejects, as much as Lebanon, the full integration of Palestinian refugees (i.e. their naturalization into citizens by 
granting them access to Syrian nationality), but, contrary to Lebanon, Syria grants full access to economic and social rights.  
21 The most important difference is between Palestinian refugees recognized by host countries as such (for example, Palestinian 
refugees holding Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese or Syrian refugee documents) and other Palestinians. Each country provides 
certain ‘rights’ related to residency status. However, each state treats refugees in other host states as foreigners subject to 
regulation applicable to foreigners (for example a Palestinian refugee holding a Lebanese refugee document is treated as foreigner 
by Egyptian authorities). Sometimes, Palestinian refugees holding documents from the host country are assimilated with nationals 
(for example, Palestinian refugees holding Lebanese refugee documents were treated, until recently, as Lebanese citizens in Syria, 
and vice versa). A Palestinian refugee holding Jordanian nationality is treated as any other Jordanian national. This does not apply 
however, to those refugees (from Gaza Strip) holding temporary Jordanian travel documents. Most of the times, however, 
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I will make reference to two examples in particular. Firstly, the exclusion of Palestinian refugees 
from international protection mechanisms related to refugees, and the resistance of host states to 
any notion of their inclusion in those mechanisms. Secondly, the way the Palestinian refugee issue 
is handled in host Arab states regarding regularization. The cases show how (surprisingly) 
consistent and unaltered the political attitude of Arab countries remains towards the issue. They 
constitute common points on which Arab states’ policies, surprisingly, converge.  
Despite the above, or maybe partially as a consequence of it, several changes have occurred with 
regards to legal recognition of Palestinian refugee economic and social rights throughout the six 
decades of Palestinian exile. These cases can be seen through the situation of Palestinian 
refugees in host Arab countries in the 1970s, following the Camp David Agreement (between Israel 
and Egypt) and the assassination of Sadat, the civil war in Lebanon, and Black September in 
Jordan. Similarly, following the first Gulf War, policies towards Palestinian workers in host Arab 
countries became more restrictive, especially in gulf countries. Those examples show how political 
crises and local contingencies had consequences on the legal recognition of Palestinian refugees, 
and the realization of their economic and social rights. A historical overview of Arab state positions 
toward Palestinian refugees clearly shows that the goals of Arab states often clash with the 
interests of the refugees themselves (Kagan 2009, 429).22   
 
3. The Protection Gap 
 
I use the term ‘protection gap’, borrowing it from other scholars, to refer to the position of 
Palestinian refugees in host Arab states.23 It suggests that international protection mechanisms are 
rare, if not absent, and leave Palestinian refugees to their fate, largely depending on regional and 
domestic politics and on the host state relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO). The gap is widened by the refusal of Israel to admit Palestinian refugees into its territory, 
and the international community’s inability or unwillingness to impose resolutions on Israel (Khalil 
2009, 5).24 As pointed out by Rempel, three other facts, taken together, inform the gap. Firstly, UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 181 of 1947 contributed to the initial forced displacement of 
Palestinians; secondly, the non-applicability of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951 Convention) definition for the majority of Palestinian refugees; thirdly, the 
establishment of separate international agencies for Palestinians (Rempel 2006, 5).  
                                                                                                                                            
Palestinians holding refugees documents of host countries (for example, a Palestinian refugee holding a refugee document from 
Lebanon) are treated in differently on borders of third states (for example, even if Lebanese are exempted from visa requirement to 
enter Egypt, Palestinian refugees holding a Lebanese travel document need a visa to cross Egyptian borders). Since the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and the later issuance of travel documents, many holders of Palestinian Authority 
travel documents are treated differently from other Palestinians, depending on the relationship of the host country with the 
Palestinian Authority itself.  
22 Making explicit reference to J. Husseini’s contribution: “The Arab States and the Refugee Issue: A Retrospective View’, in 
(Benvenisti, Gans and Hanafi 2007, 435-463). Husseini observes that Arab states had ambiguous positions toward the Palestinian 
refugee question as early as 1949. For him, Arab states took, in public, a united stand in favour of repatriation, but indicated in 
private a willingness to consider settling them in exile. Cited in: Kagan (2009, 429).  
23 For example, Akram (2002); Badil (2005); Suleiman (2006); regardless if they call it this way or not.  
24 As pointed out by Elsayed-Ali (2006, 13): “The Palestinian refugee problem is uniquely complex, protracted and significant. One 
of its peculiar aspects is that most Palestinian refugees want to return to their homes and/or lands but are unable to do so not 
because of a fear of persecution – commonly found in other refugee situations – but because they will not be allowed to enter Israel 
by the Israeli authorities.” 
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UNHCR was created by UNGA resolution 428(V), on 14 December 1950. It has a mandate to 
provide protection to refugees worldwide and to search for durable solutions (Suleiman 2006, 10). 
The term refugee, under the authoritative 1951 Convention definition,25 applies to any person who 
“[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”26  
Of the four case studies, only Egypt had ratified both the 1951 Convention and its Protocol of 
1967.27 Under a 1954 agreement between UNHCR and the Egyptian government, UNHCR has 
assumed the responsibility for refugee status determination in Egypt. It also provides protection 
and assistance to refugees (Grabska 2006, 25). Nevertheless, only a small number of Palestinian 
refugees in Egypt are registered with UNHCR, and the vast majority are considered foreign 
nationals in terms of rights and entitlements and live unassisted (Grabska 2006, 26-27). According 
to UNHCR, Palestinian refugees are not considered ‘people of concern’.28 Syria and Lebanon29 are 
not legally bound by the 1951 Convention and its Protocol. The government of Jordan, although 
not signatory of the 1951 Convention, had signed the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding signed 
with UNHCR that outlines the major principles of international protection, including the definition of 
a refugee and the principle of non-refoulement.30 This memorandum allows ‘mandate refugees’ a 
maximum stay of six months in Jordan (Olwan 2007, 99).31  
Arab states have been reluctant to accede to the 1951 Convention “because it does not address 
the specificity of Palestinian displacement” (Suleiman 2006, 11). It should be mentioned that 
UNHCR was not encouraged by the League of Arab States or by its member states to play a 
formal role in protecting Palestinian refugees due to concerns that UNHCR involvement might 
result in a decrease of international donor support to UNRWA, and for fear of weakening the ‘right 
of return’. As pointed out by Badil, the League of Arab States and UNHCR signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding, “which reaffirms the need to maintain UNRWA and its services to Palestinian 
refugees in its five areas of operation until a just solution for the problem of refugees is found on 
the basis of United Nations resolutions” (2007, 124). Additionally, the League of Arab States and 
UNHCR signed a cooperation agreement “that provides for periodical consultation, mutual 
representation, exchange of documents and information, and co-operation with UNRWA.”32  
                                               
25 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951; Available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/v1crs.htm 
26 Article 1/A (2).  
27 Egypt had expressed a number of reservations, including on articles 20, 22 (paragraph 1), 23 and 24 of the Convention of 1951, 
“because these articles consider the refugee as equal to the national.” Available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en#EndDec  
28 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486356  
29 As noted by Said (1999, 325), “Lebanon is not a signatory to either the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 or 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, so the safeguards and guarantees of these documents are not legally binding 
on Lebanon with regard to its Palestinian population.” The same applies to Syria and Jordan. This does not mean that they are not 
under international legal obligations towards refugees, since in all circumstances Customary International Law related to refugees is 
binding on all states. For more, cf. Reeds (2006).  
30  http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486566  
31 This is done with the exception of Palestinian refugees (1967 Palestinian refugees from Gaza) who have a temporary travel 
document. For more about Gazans in Jordan, see: El-Abed (2006). 
32 According to Kagan (2009, 428) the original text of article 1D of the 1951 Convention was proposed by Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia (Making reference to Akram and Goodwin-Gill (2000/2001, 247-248). As for the second sentence of article 1D, it was 
proposed by Egypt. The fact that this article was suggested by Arab states does not mean that it serves the interests of Palestinian 
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The main concern of Arab States, as pointed out by Suleiman, was “that the Palestinian refugee 
problem would not be adequately addressed if UNHCR's durable solutions were applied to 
Palestinian refugees, such as resettlement to a third country or settlement in the first country of 
asylum” (2006, 11). In fact, many of the articles of the 1951 Convention seem problematic if 
applied to Palestinians, especially article 1(C), which provides a list of cases in which the 
convention ceases to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A, which include, inter 
alia, where he or she “has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of 
his new nationality.”  
Article 1(D) of the 1951 Convention, which excludes some categories of refugees from the benefits 
of the Convention, is the most relevant paragraph.33 A similar provision was inserted into article 7 
of the 1950 Statute of UNHCR.34 According to some, article 1(D) was inserted during the drafting 
process to address the specific circumstances of Palestinian refugees (Rempel 2006, 6).  
It may be difficult or impossible to establish what the intentions behind article 1(D) were,35 if any. It 
is nevertheless clear that it has been interpreted by states in a way that excludes Palestinians from 
receiving protection or assistance from other UN agencies. A note issued by UNHCR states that, 
“[i]n today’s context, this excludes from the benefits of the 1951 Convention those Palestinians who 
are refugees as a result of the 1948 or 1967 Arab-Israeli conflicts, and who are receiving protection 
or assistance from the UNRWA.” (UNHCR 2002).   
The international community opted to keep Palestinian refugees separate from the global refugee 
protection regime by maintaining a system of separate agencies to address their situation (Kagan 
2009, 427).36 For Said, “[t]he exclusion of Palestinians derived from the fact that their predicament 
differs from that of other refugees who are covered by the Convention - the Palestinians are 
striving to be repatriated to their homeland, not to be assimilated into the country in which they 
currently reside. The status of most refugees is that they are fleeing their country to win asylum, 
and subsequently absorption, into another country. The status of the Palestinian refugees is quite 
the opposite” (1999, 325). Palestinian refugees and their leadership resisted being labeled or 
treated as refugees because “they feared that the refugee label would render them an anonymous 
mass of exiles rather than recognize their national identity and desire to return” (Kagan 2009, 
421).37 
                                                                                                                                            
refugees themselves. As suggested earlier, Arab states may have different goals that may oppose those of Palestinian refugees 
themselves. Sometimes Palestinian refugees were targeted by host Arab states, such as in Lebanon (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 
2000/2001, 226) and Jordan (Arzt 1996, 44). This means that it is wrong to make the assumption about good intentions of the 
drafters of the 1951 Convention, including those who proposed article 1D, because this assumption may be misleading and simply 
not correct.  
33 Article 1D: “This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United 
Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance. When such protection or 
assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this 
Convention” http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/v1crs.htm  
34 “Provided that the competence of the High Commissioner ... shall not extend to a person ... (c) Who continues to receive from 
other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance.” The statute is available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html . 
35 Some scholars have used the travaux preparatoires and official declarations and statements to determine signatories’ intentions, 
see: Akram and Goodwin-Gill (2000/2001).  
36 This exclusion was not due to the General Assembly conviction that Palestinian refugees were any less deserving of protection. 
On the contrary, it is maybe because of their special importance, that a separate agency, the UNCCP, was set out with the mandate 
to provide protection for Palestinian refugees (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 194).  
37 Depending largely on Rashid I. Khalidi’s (1992) historical account of the way Palestinians dealt with the issue of refugeehood, 
fearing implications on their right of return.  
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The 1951 Convention seems to be restrictive as regards who is to be considered a refugee, if 
compared, for example, to the definition of a refugee according to UNRWA.38 UNRWA defines a 
‘Palestine refugee’ as follows: “Palestine refugees are persons whose normal place of residence 
was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of 
livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.”39  
The UNRWA definition also covers the descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948, but 
it does not cover those who left Palestine in later phases. As pointed out by Takkenberg, UNRWA’s 
operational definition of a refugee did not change following the 1967 war (1998, 82). Nevertheless, 
UNRWA extended its mandate de facto by authorizing UNGA resolution 2252 of 1968, which was 
renewed on the occasion of the UNRWA annual report.  
If the shortcomings of the 1951 Convention make the UNRWA definition seems more appropriate, 
it is understandable that the non-applicability of the 1951 Convention to Palestinian refugees 
seems attractive, at least from the Palestinian perspective.40 However, the UNRWA definition is 
only ‘operational’ - it exclusively serves the purpose of defining those entitled to assistance. In 
other words, UNRWA does not pretend or aspire to define the legal status of Palestinian refugees. 
This is related to its mandate, which does not provide for legal protection. As pointed out by Susan 
Akram, UNRWA’s operational definition of a Palestinian refugee is limited to needy persons, and is 
thus markedly different from the protection-related definitions of a refugee found in the 1951 
Convention and the UNHCR statute. “As a result … the agency beneficiaries receive basic 
subsistence … but none of the protections for a wide range of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms that were to be guaranteed by the 1951 Convention and UNHCR” (Akram 2002, 39).  
There are, however, many reasons to believe that the Palestinian refugee issue is unique.41  
Arguments that are built on this uniqueness alone to support refugee exclusion from international 
refugee protection, or the ‘exclusion’ interpretation of the 1951 Convention, are not convincing.42  
                                               
38 Rempel reminds us that in the early 1950s “the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine … prepared a working definition of a 
Palestine refugee to identify those persons in need of international protection. The definition would have covered all persons 
displaced in Palestine during the 1948 war irrespective of ethnic, national or religious origins. In light of the intractable differences 
between Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians, however, the Commission’s protection mandate was greatly reduced and the 
definition was never adopted” (Rempel 2006, 6).  
39 Available at the UNRWA webpage: http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html  
40 If Palestinian refugees in Jordan, for example, were covered by the 1951 Convention they would lose their designation as 
‘refugees’ by virtue of accepting citizenship in Jordan (Said 2005, 351-352). Granting citizenship, however, does not terminate 
refugee status under UNRWA regulations. They remain, as much as their descendants, refugees and entitled to return to the lands 
from which they were driven and to receive compensation for their dispossession. 
41 Introducing the book that he had edited Palestinian Refugee Repatriation: Global Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2005), 
Michael Dumper identified at least five unique aspects of the Palestinian refugee case: the longevity combined with non-integration, 
the demographic scale and ambiguity, the unique legal and administrative framework, the Palestinian return is precluded by the 
ethno-religious nationalism of the Israeli government; and the Palestinians lack of sovereignty over any of their historic territory 
(Kagan 2009, 419-420). This exceptionalism was manifest in two areas, the eventual solution of their refugeehood and the way they 
need to be treated in exile. Historically speaking at least, the treatment of the Palestinian refugee issue as a ‘case apart’ was at the 
same time the express desire of their leadership, the scholars who studies them, and the agencies and activists that sought to assist 
them (Kagan 2007, 6). 
42 Rather, their exclusion from international protection mechanisms (due to the assistance of the UNRWA and the de facto inactive 
UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP)) is advanced as one of the reasons why they are considered as a case apart, 
not the other way around. In other words, it is correct to conclude, based on the premise that Palestinian refugees are excluded from 
the protection of 1951 Convention and from the assistance and protection of the main UN refugee agency (UNHCR), that they are 
treated as a case apart by host countries and Palestinian leadership as much as by UN refugee agencies. Scholars may even 
advance arguments in favour of due consideration for didactic purposes of this uniqueness whenever the issue of Palestinian 
refugees is dealt with or studied (in order to avoid misleading comparisons to other cases or erroneous reference to common 
principles, as those available in international refugee law). However, it is wrong to use this fact (their uniqueness) to conclude that 
they ought to be so (i.e. they ought to be dealt with outside international refugee law, and excluded from international protection).  
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Palestinians are excluded from the 1951 Convention and from the assistance and protection of the 
UNHCR, while UNRWA is mandated only to provide assistance. The UNCCP, designed to serve a 
protection role for Palestinians, is de facto ineffective.  Combined these create what Suzan Akram 
rightly describes as a ‘legal distortion’: “Palestinian refugees fall into a legal lacuna that sets them 
outside minimal international protections available for all other refugee groups in the world” (2002, 
36). Shiblak believes that the legitimacy of the decision taken in 1951 to exclude Palestinians from 
the international protection regime is being increasingly challenged by scholars, jurists and 
advocacy groups, and that there is wider awareness of the need to make the international refugee 
regime relevant for Palestinian refugees and to formally acknowledge the impact of statelessness 
(2006, 9).43 
UNRWA has no mandate of legal protection, only one of assistance.44 That assistance is limited by 
the meeting of certain conditions, including the need to be in one of its areas of operation.45 
Therefore, the Convention and the UNHCR mandate are relevant for Palestinian refugees for two 
reasons. Firstly, UNRWA presence and assistance is limited to its five areas of operation: Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian refugees in Egypt, for example, are 
not excluded by Article 1(D) because they do not receive protection or assistance from any other 
UN agency. Secondly, many Palestinian refugees residing in the five UNRWA operational areas 
are not UNRWA registered because they do not fall within its operational definition. As a result, 
                                               
43 Some have observed an increasing trend to reject the idea of ‘Palestinian exceptionalism’ (Kagan 2009), citing a book co-edited 
by E. Benvenisti, C. Gans, and S. Hanafi (Israel and the Palestinian Refugees 2007), and a book edited by Michael Dumper 
(Palestinian refugee repatriation global perspectives 2005).  It is not my objective to defend those in favor or those against this 
trend. It is not even my objective to observe whether it is really a new or old trend, or even whether it is a trend (Kagan himself, 
interestingly, changed the title of his paper, initially published as a working paper at the American University of Cairo Website in 
2007, from “The Decline…” to “The (Relative) Decline…” as he published it in the Journal of Refugee Studies in 2009). In any case, 
if this decline is a trend, then this paper fits within this trend, but only to argue that international law shall be used as basis for the 
treatment of Palestinian refugees in host countries. However, nothing in my argument questions the possibility of applying a different 
treatment as for the solution of their refugeehood (through their return, their integration in host countries, or resettlement in host 
countries). In other words, the two main issues related to Palestinian refugeehood should be separated, the first being the way host 
states should deal with them (and my argument goes in favor of using international law as basis of this treatment, as much as other 
refugees) while at the same time arguing for the possibility of envisaging a different way for the resolution of their refugeehood (the 
maintenance of the right of return). Interestingly, the Palestinians are not the first group to be deliberately blocked from integration in 
host countries, but also the Spanish Republicans (as appears clearly in the preamble of the Constitution of the International Refugee 
Organization of 1946, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,INTINSTRUMENT,UN,,3ae6b37810,0.html), (Kagan 2007, 6). 
The reason why I distinguish between both issues (the way refugees are dealt with in host country and their right of return) is that 
the later needs to be dealt with as a political issue, i.e. it may be subject to different options or solutions, while the former needs to 
be dealt with as a legal issue, i.e. it needs not to be subjected to political preferences.  Saying that the right of return is a political 
issue does not mean that it is not a legal right, since various UN resolutions and other international law instruments can form a basis 
for such a right. What I simply say is that it was possible in abstract to opt for different ways to settle the issue of Palestinian 
refugeehood, and the settlement went in the direction of their return. The existence of this option is what makes it a political issue. 
On the contrary, dealing with refugees in host countries is a legal issue, in that it is related to individuals’ entitlement to rights and 
freedoms that cannot and should not be subjected to political manipulation.  Besides, in the case of the right of return, it is possible 
for Palestinian refugees, individually to renounce this right, largely because, again, it is a political issue. While in the case of the way 
they are dealt with, they cannot renounce on their treatment in a specific way, because those are legal rights stricto senso. Finally, 
there is a recent trend to distinguish between a collective right of return and individual right of return (Kagan 2007, 10-11), the first 
targeting the possible state of Palestine, to be established side by side to Israel, while the other deals with individuals’ right to return 
to their place of origin (making part of the now state of Israel). This is what makes it a political issue. While the rights and freedoms 
of Palestinian refugees in host countries need to be dealt with on individual basis, as legal rights.  
44 Although a distinction is made in this paper, for didactic purposes, between legal protection and other kind of assistance, I do 
share the conviction that the protection that Palestinian refugees need is multilayered. Its starting point is legal, but it cannot be 
separated from opportunities for their economic self-sustenance and social development. Otherwise, legal protection becomes void 
of meaning and effectiveness (Grabska 2006, 53). 
45 Palestinian refugees, according to the above definition, are entitled to assistance, but UNRWA services are not provided for all of 
them. Palestinian refugees need to satisfy three other conditions: 1) Living in the UNRWA area of operations, 2) Being registered 
with the Agency, 3) Being in need of assistance.  
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they do not fall under its mandate, though assistance is sometimes granted on a humanitarian 
basis. 
Regardless of the intention or interpretation of Article 1(D), the ‘protection gap’ demonstrates the 
exclusion of Palestinians from 1951 Convention protection because they are already assisted by 
UNRWA.  UNRWA is mandated to provide assistance, however, not legal protection. The ‘legal 
distortion’ I believe is in making this exception a rule, and concluding that Palestinians who are 
theoretically assisted by UNRWA are always outside the mandate of the 1951 Convention,46 or that 
all Palestinians are outside its mandate. This is discriminatory and has no basis in the 1951 
Convention itself. According to the second sentence of article 1(D), “[w]hen such protection or 
assistance has ceased for any reason without the position of the refugees being definitively settled 
in accordance with relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.” This paragraph may 
be interpreted as mandating UNHCR to serve as an alternative, in order to ensure continuity of 
protection for Palestinian refugees (Suleiman 2006, 10). It also means that the 1951 Convention 
shall apply on those Palestinians who had their habitual residence in one of the five areas of 
operation of the UNRWA, but who are no more in a position to receive assistance from UNRWA.47  
This holistic, or integrated, analysis of Article 1 is also the position adopted by UNHCR (2002, 1). 
Most importantly, in countries where UNRWA does not operate, the only international agency 
available to Palestinian refugees, as it is for other refugees, is UNHCR. Even in countries of 
UNRWA operation, many undocumented refugees may indeed not be in a position to enjoy 
UNRWA assistance, or access any other international agency. This may better explain the 
reticence of the Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon (out of five total UNRWA areas of operation) in 
ratifying the convention.48  
 
4. The Lack of Regional Protection Mechanisms 
 
Given the lack of international protection, regional mechanisms, such as those presented through 
the League of Arab States, may provide an alternative.49 Two approaches have largely 
                                               
46 Such as in the case of Palestinian refugees, who happen to be in third countries holding a refugee travel document from Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, or Syria but are denied re-entry to the country of their first refuge or any other country, although registered with 
UNRWA. This has happened in Germany for example (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001). 
47 Such as the case of Palestinian refugees who are holding refugee travel document of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, but who are no 
longer able to return to the country of their first refuge, or to establish a legal residence in any other country. Such countries that 
deny the applicability of the 1951 Convention, or any other national legislation regulating asylum seekers, on the basis of the fact 
that those Palestinians come from the areas of operation of the UNRWA, actually make an erroneous interpretation of Article 1D. 
For more, see (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 219).  
48 Kagan (2009, 428) reached this same conclusion: “My reading of the plain text of article 1D is that once UNCCP became 
ineffective the exclusion applied only to those who had actual access to UNRWA assistance. Thus, I would argue, the ipso facto 
inclusion clause today would apply only if a refugee first has and then loses access to UNRWA. In my view, UNHCR does not have 
a mandate over most Palestinians in UNRWA’s area of operations (i.e. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories). The author explicitly rejected the thesis defended by Susan Akram (in her chapter “Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee 
Rights under International Law” in the book edited by Naseer Aruri: Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return, London: Pluto 
Press, 2001, pp.165-194.). In fact the thesis advanced by Akram goes further, arguing that the UNCCP’s demise gives UNHCR a 
mandate over all Palestinian refugees. Accordingly, for her, “if UNCCP has failed to fulfil its protection mandate, that function must 
be fulfilled by UNHCR” (Cited in Kagan 2009, 428).  
49 Egypt is also part of African Union. The 1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa applies 
includes provisions for residency, travel documents, and voluntary repatriation (Badil 2007, 123). The convention, however, does not 
apply on all Palestinian refugees since it applies only to refugees originally from an African state or on those who have a travel 
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characterized the response of Arab States to the Palestinian refugee issue since 1948. Firstly, 
there show solidarity with Palestinians, hosting refugees and granting them rights similar to 
citizens, but without naturalizing them.  Secondly, states work to preserve Palestinian identity 
through the preservation of the status of refugees. These not-necessarily-compatible approaches 
were reflected in the Casablanca Protocol, and successive resolutions of the League of Arab 
States (Shiblak 1996, 38-39).50 International Law and the League of Arab States do not require that 
host states grant citizenship, and few Palestinian refugees have acquired citizenship in Arab host 
states (Badil 2007, 126).51 
The most important initiative, but certainly not the only one,52 undertaken by the League was the 
‘Casablanca Protocol’ of 1965.53 This protocol is rightly considered to be one of the earliest 
regional experiments in refugee protection. Rights accorded to Palestinian refugees under the 
Casablanca Protocol are fewer and narrower in scope than those provided under the 1951 
                                                                                                                                            
document from an African country (from Egypt, for Example) enjoy the protection given in the Convention. The Convention is 
available at:  
http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Refugee_Convention.pdf 
50 The response of Arab states, it should be noted, seems to fit perfectly within the perspective of ‘temporality’; i.e. the presence of 
Palestinian refugees in host states, within the ‘right of return’ doctrine, was, and needed to be, temporary. Why then integrating 
Palestinian refugees, if their presence was perceived to be temporary? For more about Arab states attitudes towards granting 
citizenship for Palestinian refugees, see Akram and Goodwin-Gill (2000/2001, 222).  
51 Salam (1994, 26) suggested that “granting all Palestinians remaining in Lebanon the status of permanent residency cannot be 
seen as preparatory to the granting of Lebanese citizenship. The granting of permanent status would be a political solution to a 
collective problem. Naturalization, on the other hand, is an individual question to be judged on a case-by-case basis; each 
application would have weighed on its own merits, and would have to satisfy the conditions for naturalization set down in the 
citizenship laws in force, which are bound to be strict in view of the special geographic, economic, and demographic characteristics 
that have made Lebanon for well over a century a land of emigration rather than of immigration.” I tend to agree with this analysis 
because restricting access to citizenship for refugees or foreign nationals in general is the state’s exclusive power and prerogative. 
Being granted citizenship, or not, becomes irrelevant whenever there is residency status without restrictions in civil, political and 
social rights. In some cases, as in the case of Lebanon, it may be considered the best solution to accommodate both the needs of 
Palestinian refugees, and the state, i.e. human rights prerogatives and national security needs. However, such a measure (limiting 
access to nationality) should not be justified by political considerations, but rather on legal grounds; besides, it should be regulated 
by law and not be dependent on the discretion of the administrative authorities and it should be enforced by state authorities under 
the supervision and the control of the judicial authorities. In addition, such measures cannot be justified if undertaken exclusively 
against refugees, or against a specific category of refugees, based on nationality, religion, or sectarian affiliation. In other words, 
even in the case of national interest, discrimination is prohibited. What is more, if restricting access to nationality through long 
residence may be understandable in the context of forced migration and irregular entry (at least from the point of view of national 
regulation concerning entry of foreign nationals), it is less justifiable when it is related to access to nationality through family 
unification. Palestinians though experience the exact opposite. Most countries have special provisions prohibiting the naturalization 
of Palestinians, provisions based on political grounds and in accordance with Arab League resolutions. Furthermore, marriage of a 
male Palestinian to a female citizen of a host country does not constitute grounds for naturalization or special residency rights either 
for the husband, who is not a national, or any children (Shiblak 1996, 39). This is the case of Lebanon for example. Under the 
Lebanese law, “nationality can only be passed on by the father (paternalistic application of the principle of jus sanguinis)” (Amnesty 
International 2006, 10). However, many of the Palestinians in Lebanon who obtained Lebanese citizenship between 1950 and 1972 
were cases of Palestinian women (and their children) who were married to Lebanese husbands (Arzt 1996, 47). In Syria it is 
possible for a female Palestinian married to Syrian national to obtain the Syrian citizenship, but not vice versa (Arzt 1996, 46; Akram 
and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 224). In Some cases (such as in the case of Palestinian refugees in Egypt and for the Gazans in 
Jordan) access to nationality of host country is denied for Palestinian women (and their children) even when married to a citizen 
male. In brief, discourses related to the restriction of Palestinian refugee rights and freedoms are often coupled with political 
arguments rather than legal ones. 
52 Other resolutions have been adopted by the League of Arab States such as: Resolution 424, 14 September 1952, related to the 
reunification of divided families; Resolution 714, 27 January 1952, related to the issuance of a standard travel document (Badil 
2007, 123-124). However, no uniform identity paper or travel document has ever been designed or issued by the League of Arab 
States. Travel documents are issued by individual member states. Resolution 2600 of 1970 states that the acquisition of another 
nationality would not trigger the cessation of refugee status in LAS member states.  
53 The text of Casablanca Protocol and the reservation expressed by states are available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=country&amp;docid=460a2b252&amp;skip=0&amp;category=LEGAL&amp;coi=SYR&amp;sear
chin=title&amp;display=50&amp;sort=date    
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Convention (Suleiman 2006, 11).54 However, as pointed out by Badil , “some of its provisions grant 
greater rights in theory than those set out in the 1951 Convention” (2007, 123-124).55 
The Casablanca Protocol was adopted by a majority decision of the Council of the Arab League. 
This means that its contents are only binding upon those member states willing to accept them, 
either in full or subject to reservations (Takkenberg 1998, 144).56 Two main elements have 
determined the treatment of Palestinian refugees in host Arab states: granting Palestinian refugees 
full citizenship rights, but denying them naturalization, and issuing them Refugee Travel 
Documents in order to maintain their refugee status (Shiblak 2006, 8). 
The Protocol calls for granting Palestinian refugees equal treatment as nationals with regards to 
work. Palestinians should have the right to leave the country and return to it, to enter another Arab 
country and leave it. Palestinians shall be provided valid travel documents, and the holders of 
those documents shall be granted the same treatment as nationals in terms of the issuing of visas. 
The Casablanca protocol was clear about the fact that Palestinians should keep their nationality.57 
A special resolution on the treatment of Palestinians in Arab countries was adopted by the Council 
of Arab Ministers of the Interior in December 1982 (Takkenberg 1998, 147). According to that 
resolution, “[t]he Travel Document for Palestinian Refugees issued by any Arab country is to be 
accorded the same treatment as the passport of the citizens of that country,” and “the bearer of a 
Travel Document for Palestine refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as nationals of the 
state issuing this document, as regards freedom of residence, work and movement.”   
Those constituted relatively high standards for the treatment of Palestinians, at least on the 
theoretical level.58  Since 1991, and the PLO’s position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 
standards decreased (Badil 2007, 125). In fact, the League of Arab States adopted Resolution 
5093, which “authorized states to treat Palestinian refugees in accordance with domestic law rather 
than under the provisions set forth in the 1965 Protocol” (Badil 2007, 123-124). The resolution 
weakened respect for the Casablanca Protocol. Since then, restrictions of residency rights, 
freedom of movement, employment, property ownership rights, and access to government services 
are now imposed on Travel Document holders in all Arab countries. In addition, education, health, 
                                               
54 Takkenberg (1998, 142-143) provides an interesting comparison between the Casablanca Protocol and the 1951 Convention 
concerning travel documents. He mentions, for example, that contrary to the convention, the Casablanca Protocol leaves 
responsibility for renewing or re-issuing travel documents to first refuge states. 
55 In support of this claim, Badil (2007, 123-124) provides two examples. First, in the arena of self-employment and employment in 
the liberal professions, the Casablanca Protocol provides for the same treatment as that given to nationals, whereas the 1951 
Convention only provides for treatment as favourable as possible, and not less than that accorded to resident aliens. Second, Article 
26 of the 1951 Convention provides for freedom of movement within the host country, whereas Articles 2 and 3 of the Casablanca 
Protocol also provide for freedom of movement between Arab states.  
56 Only seven member states have ratified the Protocol without reservation, including two of the major host countries: Syria and 
Jordan. Egypt ratified the Protocol without reservation, but according to Shiblak (2006, 8), once fully committed, effectively withdrew 
from the Protocol. Lebanon has endorsed the Casablanca Protocol with reservations expressed on three articles out of five 
(Takkenberg 1998, 374). 
57 Interestingly, as outlined by Takkenberg (1998, 141), the Casablanca protocol contains a change in language, from ‘Palestinian 
refugees’ to ‘Palestinians’. He argues that this change is “apparently initiated by the realization that the legal position of non-refugee 
Palestinians is much the same as that of those who had become refugees in 1948-49. Both categories of persons being largely 
composed of de facto or de jure stateless persons, they are equally in need of the status provided for in the Protocol.” 
58 It is an improvement, at least in theory. However, in reality, this resolution was not necessarily implemented. According to Badil 
(2007, 125), investigations conducted by the League of Arab States Supervisors Conference have concluded that the 
implementation of the standards set up by the League for the treatment of Palestinians in member states is poor. According to 
Shiblak (1996, 42), Arab states had been annulling on an individual basis and through administrative decree the rights accorded to 
Palestinians under the Casablanca Protocol. 
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and social benefits for Palestinians are increasingly being curtailed, if not disposed of outright 
(Shiblak 1996, 42).59  
 
5. The status of Palestinian refugees in host Arab states: a matrix? 
 
The ‘protection gap’ and the ‘legal distortion’ mean one thing in certainly: Palestinians lack 
international protection, and are largely dependent on the domestic legal systems of concerned 
states. The national law of host countries matters for Palestinian refugees, as legal status matters 
for the realization of rights and freedoms. In other words, legal status matters because it is related 
to the ‘right to have rights’ (Shiblak 2006, 9). A clarification needs to be made, though. While, in 
this paper, I talk largely about ‘legal status’ it is maybe more appropriate to use the plural of status. 
Since the distribution of rights depends on national laws, there is definitively not ‘one’ legal status, 
but rather various legal statuses (depending on the state), and various types of ‘Palestinians’ 
(depending on the conditions of refugeehood).  
The most appropriate metaphor to describe this plurality is not a ‘map’, but a matrix, in which legal 
status is not defined on general and abstract norms, but largely dependent on contingent 
conditions related to the Palestinians concerned. Distributing rights and freedoms according to this 
matrix inevitably means that rights and freedoms may be more easily subject to host country 
manipulation.  This manipulation could depend on government politics and local concerns on the 
one side, and the unstable relationship host countries have with the PLO on the other.60   
The first criterion for the determination of a legal status is related to the idea of the ‘first refuge’.61 In 
order to be a Palestinian refugee in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria or Egypt, the person needs to satisfy 
the terms of the UNRWA definition and/or those imposed by the states, which entitle certain (not 
all) Palestinian refugees to refugee status.  This depends largely on where they happened to be 
able to flee in 1948, and, in some cases, in 1967.  
This status sometimes involves favourable treatment,62 such as becoming nationals63 or being 
treated as nationals.64 In countries, are treated as foreign residents.65 In these cases, Palestinian 
                                               
59 Takkenberg (1998, 149), after having referred to Shiblak’s point of view, considering Resolution 5093 as an official revocation of 
the Protocol, argued, a contrario, that it is “questionable whether member states are able by mere recommendation to nullify an 
international agreement which was officially ratified by the member states or to which the member state became bound by other 
means… Whatever the formal position may be, it is obvious, however, that the spirit to live up to the obligations embodied in the 
Protocol has been severely weakened.” The present author tends to agree with this last position. 
60 Not to mention an almost forgotten element in this formulation, that is the correlation between the kind of rights and freedoms 
granted to Palestinian refugees in the host countries with those enjoyed by citizens. The political and legal systems can be, at best, 
described as engaging in their first steps towards democracy, rule of law, and respect of human rights and freedoms (Grabska 2006, 
52). It is noteworthy that Jordanian women married to Gazans do not have the legal right to transmit citizenship to their children, as 
is the case with any foreign father. These documents, thus, do not entitle their holders to the rights recognized by Jordanian citizens, 
such as the right to health care, education in public schools, entry to professions and other rights exclusively reserved for Jordanian 
citizens. 
61 As mentioned earlier, the first refuge is particularly relevant for Palestinians for that it determine the country responsible for re-
issuing travel documents for them.  
62 Such as in Syria, and largely for Palestinians in Jordan, see: (Badil 2007, 125). 
63 Such as the case of ‘most’ Palestinians in Jordan. I say ‘most’ because there is a distinction between those Palestinians that flow 
from Palestine following 1948 Nakba, and others who fled in 1967 and arrived to Jordan. The first group obtained nationality, while 
the second group, a distinction is done between those who fled West Bank (deemed internally displaced because West Bank was 
part of Jordan) and those who fled from Gaza Strip, until then under Egyptian administration. The second group did not have access 
to nationality, while the first had had access to nationality. Within the later group, however, a further distinction is done based on 
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refugees are not only not granted rights as citizens (Reeds 2006, 370-371), but face even more 
restrictions than other foreign residents. In all cases, however, they are not treated in line with 
other refugees.66  
There is no ‘one’ legal status, but at least67 four, one for each of the four countries of concern in 
this paper. In each country there are different sub-categories, according to different criteria, set out 
through the discretionary power of the states. Most importantly, however, the plurality of legal 
status means that satisfying UNRWA conditions does not make them ‘one category’ of persons, 
governed by the same set of rules. Although registration at UNRWA may be necessary as a 
condition for the recognition by host state, it is only one of many other conditions.  
In Egypt, where UNRWA is not present, it is only the host state that sets out the conditions for 
recognizing a Palestinian refugee and granting him or her certain rights. A Palestinian refugee 
registered by UNRWA in Lebanon has a different legal status from one registered by the same 
organization in Jordan or Syria, and vice versa.68 ‘Extra’ restrictive measures undertaken with 
regards to Palestinian refugees explains why countries known for better treatment of Palestinian 
refugees (such as Syria and Jordan) had little to offer Palestinian refugees from Iraq, for example, 
following the invasion in 2003 and persecution of Palestinians, who remained stuck on the borders 
and had to be resettled in other countries (Al-Khalidi, Hoffmann and Tanner 2007, 15).69  
                                                                                                                                            
place of residence, especially following the 1988 decision to severe legal and administrative liaison with the West Bank, undertaken 
by late King Hussein.  
64  Palestinians in Syria are treated as nationals, with some exceptions though. As pointed out by Reeds (2006, 374), “Syria passed 
laws giving Palestinians a status equal to that of Syrian nationals. It is not necessary for Palestinians to acquire a permit in order to 
work, and they are permitted to own more than one commercial enterprise. They may travel freely and settle anywhere in the 
country. Palestinians are eligible to receive free secondary education from government schools and are granted equal access to 
Syrian universities.” The same author, however, outlines some restrictions imposed on Palestinian refugees “which Syrian nationals 
are not burdened. For example, Palestinians residing in Syria may not vote, and they are not permitted to own multiple homes. In 
addition, despite the fact that they have not been offered citizenship, Palestinian refugees are subject to compulsory service in the 
Syrian army.” Then she concludes, “Palestinian refugees in Syria enjoy equality with Syrian citizens in most aspects of their lives 
and have achieved a significant degree of integration.”  
65  Such as in Egypt (for more about Palestinians in Egypt, see: (El-Abed 2006)) and Lebanon; according to Takkenberg (1998, 
162), Palestinians in Lebanon are in principle subject to the same legal status as other foreign nationals, with the exception of the 
period between 1969 and 1987 which was to a limited extent regulated under the Cairo Agreement and its annexes.  
66 Regardless of the opinion one may have, whether or not this exclusion is negative or positive for Palestinian refugees, it is a 
matter of fact that Palestinians are not treated as refugees in host Arab countries. Based on the empirical, historical data I used in 
this paper, it appears that this exclusion was at the end of the day negative in terms of protecting Palestinian refugees. Although 
labeled for long time as a special case, “[Palestinian refugees] are increasingly asking to be recognized as just refugees, full stop” 
(Kagan 2009, 434). 
67 I say ‘at least’ because there may be different legal statuses according to the concerned Palestinian refugees (in Jordan for 
example, there is a difference between Palestinian refugees of 1948 and those who arrived from Gaza Strip in 1967). Besides, I say 
‘at least’ because, historically speaking, the way Palestinian refugees issue is regulated may be different (for example the 
Palestinians in Egypt before and after the assassination of Sadat). 
68 Syria had expressly regulated this issue, as will be presented in the coming paragraphs.  
69 The Palestinians of Iraq are about 30,000, mostly Muslim Sunnis, are not registered with a UN agency. They were caught in 
sectarian violence and suffered particularly because of preferential treatment, real or perceived, under Saddam.  Many Palestinians 
of Iraq came to Syria between 2003 and 2005 and settled in northern Syria. In early 2006 Syrian government started to apply a 
more restrictive policy towards Palestinians of coming from Iraq. In April-May 2006, UNHCR, the International Organization for 
Migration and UNRWA organized a convoy to Syria for Palestinians who had been stranded on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, where 
Jordanian authorities had refused them entry. After negotiations with the Syrian government, these people were allowed into Syria 
and then settled in a camp at al-Hol, near Hasaka, in north-eastern Syria. They have access to some local services such as schools. 
Hamas seemed to play a proactive role in resolving the deadlock around the Palestinian refugees blocked between Iraq and Jordan 
(Al-Khalidi, Hoffmann and Tanner 2007, 14).  
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Egypt  
In Egypt, legal texts and national institutions dealing with foreign nationals are both, in principle, 
applicable and accessible to Palestinian refugees (Takkenberg 1998, 150-154). Law No.89/196070 
provides that there are three residency categories for foreign nationals in Egypt, including 
Palestinians. The law provides that entry to or exit from Egypt is granted only to those holding 
passports or travel documents issued by an entity recognized by the Egyptian authorities, and 
those documents should enable their holder to return to the country of issue. The Ministry of the 
Interior has discretionary power to exempt any foreign national or category of foreign national from 
the application of (part of) the law, however.  
There are three types of residence permits in Egypt. Applicants satisfying conditions for special 
residence are granted a ten-year permit, ordinary residence a five-year permit, and temporary 
residence a one-to- three-year permit.71 Other foreign nationals, including Palestinian refugees, 
who do not satisfy conditions for special and ordinary permits, acquire a temporary permit. 
According to Badil (2007, 126-127), the majority of Palestinians in Egypt fall within the third 
category; those few Palestinians recognized as refugees by UNHCR are granted six-month 
renewable residence permits.72  
At one time, Egypt fully implemented the 1965 Casablanca Protocol and treated Palestinians on an 
equal footing to Egyptians.  This happened particularly during the Nasser era. In the 1970s, things 
changed and privileges were gradually abolished.73 Many new decrees were put in place. 
Palestinians needed to pay fees to have their visas renewed, and they were required to show proof 
of having changed money and spent a minimum amount in hard currency per month. Following the 
Gulf crisis in 1990, their situation worsened.74 Since 2007 the Rafah crossing point has 
systematically closed, and the Gaza Strip has been under siege. 
                                               
70 Law No.89 relating to the entry and stay of foreigners and their exit from Egypt of 18 Mar. 1960. Official Journal No.71, dated 24 
Mar. 1960, amended by law No.49/1968, 124/1980, and 100/1983. In a written statement presented by the Government of Egypt to 
the Committee on Migrant Workers during its Sixth session (23-27 April 2007), it is stated that illegal migration are governed by Law 
No.89/1960 as amended by Law No.99/1996. See: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/docs/CMW.C.EGY.Q.1.Add.1_ar.pdf 
71 There is discordance between authors concerning temporary residence. Badil (2007, 126) mentions that it is from one to three 
years. Takkenberg (1998, 152), Reeds (2006, 373) and many others mention that permit validity is from one to three years. The 
author did not find in the literature any information supporting what appeared in Badil’s publication. On the contrary, information 
collected by the local researcher from official resources talks about one to three years of validity. Certainly, it is more logical to 
distinguish temporary residence from ordinary residence, otherwise there would be no need to create two different categories of 
residency. Takkenberg (1998, 152) mentions that special residence were issued for Palestinian refugees, residing in the ‘Northern 
Region’, which during the period of the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) referred to Syria. Abu Seada (2007, 44) refers to special 
residence as granted, inter alia, to Palestinian refugees.  
72 Officially, those refugees reported by UNHCR should be granted a three years residency permit:  
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/MFA_Portal/Templates/Generic_Content_Unit.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRNODEGUID=%7b94A7CD70-
84BC-4E8D-9CD2-E9B727FE884D%7d&NRORIGINALURL=%2fMissions%2fUSA%2fNewyork%2fConsulate%2fen-
GB%2fServices%2fRules%2band%2bRegulations%2f&NRCACHEHINT=Guest#Residence%20in%20Egypt%20for%20Foreign%20
Nationals  
73 According to Arzt (1996, 56), the mild privileges enjoyed by Palestinian refugees in Egypt (work in public sector jobs, access to 
governmental schools, etc.) came to an end “when Palestinian students and the PLO demonstrated against Anwar Sadat’s 1977 trip 
to Jerusalem and the organization and other Arab states “froze” their relations with Cairo. The status of Palestinians was 
downgraded from “residents” to “foreigner,” who must pay hard currency to obtain permission to remain.”  
74 As noted by Takkenberg (1998, 153): “Renewal of residence permits became much more difficult. Palestinian children were no 
longer allowed into government schools and tuition fees for higher education increased dramatically and, unlike before, were due in 
hard currencies.” The same author (1998, 154) explains how humiliating the procedure was for escorting those holding an Egyptian 
Travel documents willing to return to the Gaza Strip, for whom a transit visa of 72 hours was issued, in order to prevent them from 
staying on illegally in Egypt. Those holding an Egyptian Travel Document, were no longer able to return to the Gaza Strip, and were 
denied both entry and transit visas. Those who managed to reach Cairo Airport without a visa were detained for long periods. The 
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Jordan  
Jordan has been exposed to Palestinian migratory waves consistently since the creation of the 
state of Israel in 1948. The country received wave of Palestinians after the 1967 war, during which 
Israel captured the remaining parts of historic Palestine: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Most 
of the first group were granted Jordanian citizenship under a law promulgated while the West Bank 
was still under Jordanian military administration.75 For the second group a distinction is made 
between those Palestinians who fled the West Bank during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and those 
who had been living in Jordan but were considered internally displaced persons because they 
moved from one part of the country to another, i.e. from the west to the east of Jordan. These 
people were entitled to a five-year passport and full citizenship rights since they were citizens of 
Jordan prior to the war.76 Unlike Palestinians who came from the West Bank, the ex-residents of 
the Gaza Strip living in Jordan do not qualify for citizenship, and they are only given renewable 
two-year passports, valid for the purpose of potential travel to countries willing to accept the 
document. These documents are no more than residence permits, and do not connote citizenship 
or any of its inalienable rights. They are provided for the purposes of identification and travel.  
In July 1988, late King Hussein ordered all legal and administrative links with the West Bank be 
severed. This decision, which did not amount to a law, was followed by instructions from the Prime 
Minister to implement it and stripped Jordanian citizenship from those Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin who had been resident in the West Bank before 31 July 1988.77 A dual card system was 
created to facilitate a distinction between Palestinian citizens living in Jordan and those living in the 
occupied West Bank.78  
Place of residence determines whether an individual is a Jordanian citizen or has become a 
Palestinian. Article 2 of the Instructions stipulates that “every individual who was residing in the 
West Bank before the 31st of July 1988 is a Palestinian, not a Jordanian citizen.” This stipulation 
has been expanded to include individuals who obtained passports issued by the Palestinian 
                                                                                                                                            
same applies for those who had been living in Egypt for a long time. In particular, when Kuwait expelled hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians in 1991, Egypt refused to recognize valid Egyptian-issued documents held by about 25,000 Gazans, who had been 
working in Kuwait and out of Gaza Strip for many years (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 223). 
75 According to this law, a Jordanian citizen is: “…Any person with previous Palestinian nationality except the Jews before the date 
of May 14, 1948 residing in the Kingdom during the period from December 20, 1949 and February 16, 1954” (Article 3).  The 
Jordanian Nationality Law No.6/1954 is available in English at:  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,LEGAL,,,JOR,,3ae6b4ea13,0.html  
76 In 1988, late King Hussein ordered the severing of all legal and administrative links with the West Bank, a distinction was done 
between those living in Jordan proper and those living in the occupied West Bank. The residence at that time determined who is to 
be considered a Jordanian citizen and who is to be considered Palestinian. The Palestinian nationality is deemed to larger 
categories of persons, including those (a) individuals who obtained passports issued by the Palestinian Authority with the approval 
of Israel; b) individuals working in Palestinian Authority institutions; c) individuals who hold “family reunion” documents issued by the 
Israeli authorities; and d) individuals who had been residing in the East Bank before the issuance of the Instructions (NCHR 2006, 
12). 
77 Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,LEGAL,,,JOR,,43cd04b94,0.html (accessed on 11 September 2008). It is 
estimated that over one million people lost their Jordanian citizenship as a result. According to the provisions of the Jordanian 
Constitution and the Jordanian citizenship law, however, they were Jordanian citizens (Olwan 2005, 156). Instead, these people 
were deemed to be Palestinians rather than Jordanians. It is worth mentioning that the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty (26 Oct. 1994) 
refers to the West Bank as ‘territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967’ (Takkenberg 1998, 156).  
78 It should be noted that some refer to earlier dates for that measure that goes back to 1983: “Palestinians who were living in and 
citizens of Jordan on that date were provided with a yellow card, which represents full residency and citizenship status. Green cards 
were provided to Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and to those who left the occupied West Bank after 1 June 1983. 
Green card holders have no right of residence in Jordan. They are, however, entitled to visit Jordan for short periods” (Badil 2007, 
154-155). For more about the dual card system since 1983, see also: (Arzt 1996, 43; Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 223) 
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Authority with the approval of Israel, individuals working in Palestinian Authority institutions, 
individuals who hold “family reunion” documents issued by the Israeli authorities, and individuals 
who had been residing in the East Bank before the issuance of the Instructions (NCHR 2006, 12). 
As a consequence of the Royal Decree, Jordanians of Palestinian origin residing in the West Bank 
before 31 July 1988 lost their Jordanian nationality without having recourse to Palestinian 
nationality due to the non-existence, from a legal point of view, of a Palestinian state that could 
grant Palestinian citizenship.79 Following the decision, Palestinians who were living on the East 
Bank of the Jordan or elsewhere before 31 July 1988 remain Jordanian citizens. As such, they are 
entitled to a “family book”, a national number, and a Jordanian passport for five years. They are 
also issued with a yellow identification card by a special directorate of the Ministry of the Interior 
called the Department for Inspection and Follow-Up. The yellow card distinguishes those 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin from other Jordanians. This card allows them to travel to the West 
Bank over the Allenby Bridge crossing.  
However, West Bank residents who were living in the occupied West Bank before 31 July 1988 
have no right to Jordanian citizenship. Instead they are entitled to acquire temporary Jordanian 
passports (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 222). King Hussein made a speech on 7 August 
1988 in which he stated that, ‘passports will remain until such time as the Palestinian state is 
hopefully created and then obviously Palestinians will have their own passports representing them 
as citizens of that state’ (Takkenberg 1998, 157). 
These Passports were valid for two years, until 1995 when they began being issued for five years. 
Visas were required to remain in Jordan, and those West Bankers already residing in Jordan 
suffered restrictive measures (Shiblak 1996, 41). West Bank residents are also issued a green 
identification card by the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior, allowing them to visit Jordan and return 
to the occupied West Bank, but not to reside in Jordan. The two documents are issued solely as 
travel documents and they do not constitute an attestation of citizenship (Arzt 1996, 43).  
Palestinians in the West Bank are not Jordanians and, as such, they have no right to enter 
Jordan.80 More and more Jordanians of Palestinian origin are deprived of their Jordanian 
citizenship on the basis of the administrative disengagement decision, with no consideration being 
given to constitutionality or legality.81 
                                               
79 The legality of the Jordanian decision and the Instructions issued therewith has been questioned. But the legal concerns 
surrounding this issue are beyond the scope of this work. It is sufficient to note that both are administrative decisions and that 
deciding the status of citizenship on the basis of an administrative decision is a violation of the provisions of Article five of the 
Jordanian Constitution and citizenship law number six of 1954, both of which do not include any provision that allows for the 
withdrawing of citizenship by a simple administrative decision. It is to be regretted that lawsuits against decisions taken by the 
Minister of the Interior, or any official, in matters related to citizenship, before the High Court of Justice, are not resolved, in general, 
to the satisfaction of claimants (NCHR 2006, 28). The Jordanian High Court of Justice ruled in January 1991 that the severance of 
legal and administrative ties with the West Bank constituted “an act of state”, and as such it lay beyond its jurisdiction. While the 
Court acknowledged that the petitioner held a Jordanian passport, it emphasized that ‘not every holder of a Jordanian passport is 
necessarily a citizen of Jordan’ (Takkenberg 1998, 156). 
80 From time to time Jordan makes it harder for Palestinians, who were for decades granted free entry, to enter from the West Bank. 
On several occasions, the Jordanian authorities have turned Palestinians with no permits from the Interior Ministry away at the 
Allenby Bridge near Jericho, the last remaining exit and entry point for West Bankers to leave Israeli controlled territory. The 
blocking of Palestinian entry into Jordan was a reflection of Jordan’s anxiety about a possible new wave of Palestinian immigration 
from the West Bank. Nevertheless and due to the special ties between Jordan and the West Bank, the number of travellers through 
the Allenby Bridge is increasing.   
81 The National Centre for Human Rights repeatedly condemned these withdrawals of Jordanian citizenship without judicial ruling. 
Moreover, it considers these practices arbitrary and a violation of a right, which is the basis of all other rights in the country. 
Furthermore, the Jordanian High Court still considers the withdrawal of Jordanian citizenship a sovereign act, which does not 
encourage citizens to file lawsuits related to the denial of citizenship (NCHR 2006, 38). In a recent report by Human Rights Watch 
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Lebanon  
In Lebanon Palestinians can be divided into three different categories: those registered at UNRWA 
(and with the Lebanese authorities),82 those with identity cards issued by the Lebanese authorities 
but not registered by UNRWA (Elsayed-Ali 2006, 13), and those who are neither recognized by the 
Lebanese authorities nor under UNRWA’s mandate. Only the first two categories are deemed legal 
in Lebanon, so the following legislations apply, as they do to any foreigner residing in Lebanon.83  
Lebanon views Palestinians no differently than other foreign nationals residing in Lebanon (Arzt 
1996, 46).84 A foreign national refers to any natural or juridical person who is not a Lebanese 
subject, a concept that relies primarily on nationality (Al-Natour 1997, 363). In 1962, Palestinians 
became one of the ‘five categories’ of foreigners.85 Lebanese law made it mandatory for this 
category of foreign nationals to come to the General Directorate of General Security before the end 
of September 1962, so as to rectify their status and receive temporary or permanent residency 
cards.86  
The apparent hostility towards the idea of integration of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has not 
always been the rule. The Palestinian-Lebanese relationship has passed through different stages, 
dependent largely on the PLO-Lebanese government relationship.87 The Lebanese government set 
                                                                                                                                            
had pointed that, since 1988, Jordan had withdrawn its nationality from thousands of its citizens of Palestinian origin – over 2700 
between 2004 and 2008 alone. In many cases the organization had identified, the Jordanian authorities have done so “in an 
arbitrary manner and in violation of Jordan’s nationality law of 1954” (HRW 2010, 1). 
82 Lebanon seems to be adopting UNRWA’s procedural definition. In other words, registration with UNRWA and receipt of UNRWA 
rations is a prerequisite for the issuance of refugee documents and for permission to stay in the country (Shiblak 1996, 40). 
Accordingly, Palestinian refugees legally residing in Lebanon are those who during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war took direct 
refuge in Lebanon and were registered with UNRWA in Lebanon.  
83 Arrêté No.319, of 2 August 1962, regulating the situation of foreign nationals in Lebanon, was issued by the Minister of the 
Interior. Following the adoption of the orders, Palestinians are one of the five categories of foreign nationals described in Article 1, 
para.3: ‘Foreigners who do not carry documentation from their countries of origin, and reside in Lebanon on the basis of resident 
cards issued by the Directorate of Public Security, or identity card issued by the General Directorate of the Department of Affairs of 
the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ (Suleiman 2006, 14; Takkenberg 1998, 163). It should be noted that the original law governing 
entry into Lebanon or residency therein or exit from the country, dated 10 July 1962, did not include provision for the Palestinian 
presence in Lebanon, though that presence had been officially acknowledged since 1948 (Al-Natour 1997, 363-364).  
84 However, contrary to other foreigners, a Palestinian who manages to obtain a non-Lebanese passport is denied residency rights 
altogether (Sayigh 1995, 44; Arzt 1996, 46; Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 224). 
85 Following the adoption of Arrêté No. 319 of 2/8/1962, available in French at:  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,LEGAL,,LEGISLATION,LBN,4562d8cf2,3ae6b4ed58,0.html  
86 In compliance with this Decision, Palestinians residing in Lebanon went to the General Directorate of the Department of Refugee 
Affairs to rectify their status and obtain the designated cards. This treatment became standard practice (Al-Natour 1997, 363-364). 
Among the consequences of the Cairo Agreement, and the situation it created with respect to residency status for the Palestinians 
already in Lebanon, was the promulgation by Lebanon's Interior Minister of Decision No. 136, dated 20 September 1969. This 
Decision placed the status of all foreigners in Lebanon on an equal footing and singled out from this equality in treatment (Article 4, 
Paragraph (e)) resident Palestinians holding the identification cards issued by the General Directorate of the Department of 
Palestine Refugee Affairs (Al-Natour 1997, 363-364).  
87  The Palestinian-Lebanese relationship passed through several different phases (Suleiman 2006, 21-23) and highlights six 
historical periods: 1) Adaptation and Hope (1948-1958): Palestinians were welcomed by the public and the government. There was 
a relatively acceptable level of freedom of expression and political activity. Palestinians were perceived as a cheap labour force that 
could contribute to economic prosperity; 2) First Crackdown and Covert Activities (1958-1969): This phase began with the coming to 
power of General Chehab. Chehab's regime initiated an aggressive policy toward Palestinians, subjecting the camps to tight control; 
3) Overt Activity and Institutional Building (1969-1982): The Cairo agreement resulted in a sharp increase in the building of social, 
economic and cultural institutions, in addition to political, military and organizational activity; 4) From PLO Departure to Ta'if (1982-
1989): In the aftermath of the PLO’s departure from Lebanon, Palestinian refugees survived many harrowing experiences; 5) 
Deliberate Neglect: Ta'if, Oslo and Beyond (1989-2005): This phase is marked by three landmark political events that had a 
profound impact on the Palestinian scene in Lebanon: The Ta'if agreement, which put an end to the Lebanese civil war in 1989; the 
Madrid peace conference, which brought together the major parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1991; the Israeli-PLO Oslo 
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up a specific administrative apparatus to govern the Palestinian presence in the country from the 
early stages of arrival, but it has evolved over time.88   
In 1995, the Lebanese Minister of Interior issued a Decree obliging Palestinian refugees holding a 
Lebanese travel document to obtain exit/re-entry visas from the Office of Public Security, which are 
affixed to their travel document or laissez-passer, before leaving Lebanon.89 Those who were 
outside the country (Syria excluded) on 1st of June 1995 have to obtain a re-entry visa through their 
respective countries of residence prior to returning (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 224; 
Takkenberg 1998, 165). This ruling effectively meant that “these laissez-passer holders no longer 
have the legal right to reside in Lebanon, or indeed anywhere else in the world” (M. A. Khalidi 
1995, 28).90  
 
Syria  
Contrary to other host countries, the Syrian government issued specific legislation expressly 
regulating Palestinian refugees. Syrian law distinguishes between two categories of Palestinians: 
those having the status of refugee according to Syrian law, and those who do not have this status. 
For the first group, Syrian law regulates the responsibilities of national institutions responsible for 
the follow up of their affairs.91 Residency permits for Palestinian refugees in Syria are issued in 
accordance with the Casablanca Protocol (Badil 2007, 127).92 It grants Palestinians privileges,93 
                                                                                                                                            
Accords of September 1993 and its subsequent relevant agreements; 6) Lebanese-Palestinian Relationship: A New Era (2005-
present ): This new era is characterized by greater public and official Lebanese willingness to discuss Palestinian refugee rights in a 
more rational though critical manner. 
88 This apparatus has evolved over the years (Al-Natour 1997, 361-363; Suleiman 2006, 11-13): The Central Committee for 
Refugee Affairs: created by presidential decree No. 11657 of 26/4/1948. The task of the central committee was to administer the 
Palestinian presence with respect to statistics, accommodation, relief and health care. The Committees was also set up to 
cooperate with UNRWA in defining the status of Palestine refugees. The Department of Affairs of Palestinian Refugees (DAPR): 
This office of the Ministry of the Interior was created by a presidential decree No.42 of 31/3/1959. Simultaneously Decree No. 927 
was issued to define the tasks of DAPR. All issues relating to Palestinian refugees are administered by this department (Said 2005, 
352-353). Other related decrees were issued, such as Decree No. 2867 of 16/12/1959, which identified the DAPR structure and the 
tasks of its General Director. The Higher Authority of Palestinian Affairs: this government agency was created by the presidential 
Decree No.3909 of 26/4/1960 under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign and Repatriate Affairs. This authority was authorized 
to fulfil tasks of political and national security perspectives, without overlapping with DAPR. Department of Political and Refugees 
Affairs: this was the new name given to the above DAPR. The new name was given by Decree No.4082 of November 2000, though 
it kept the same responsibilities. However, administratively it was downgraded from General Directorate to a department affiliated to 
another directorate, with few prerogatives remaining in the hands of the Director. This change was criticized by (International 
Federation for Human Rights 2003, 12): “The Lebanese government does not want this official status of Host State for the 
Palestinian refugees anymore.” It should be noted, however, that reference is made on the Lebanese General Security website to 
the Palestinian Refugees Administration Affairs (Edaret Shuoun Al-Lajeen Al-Falastenyeen):  
http://www.general-security.gov.lb/English/TravelingDocs/Palestinian/    
89 Decree No.478/1995 Regulating Entry and Exit of Palestinians into and out of Lebanon, issued in September 22, 1995. 
90 It should be noted that such a measure was undertaken by the Lebanese authorities following the expulsion of Palestinians from 
Libya in order to keep thousands of Palestinians with Lebanese Refugee travel documents out of Lebanon (Shiblak 1996, 40). 
91 Law No. 450 of 25 January 1949.  
92 Palestinian refugee residency cards are granted to those who entered Syria in 1948 and who were registered at the register of 
Immigration and Passports and at the registers of the Public Agency for Palestinian Refugees, and their children aged 10-18, with 
their legal representative or those the Ministry of the Interior accepts. It should be noted that the entry, residence, and departure of 
foreign nationals in Syria is currently regulated by legislative decree No.29/1970, which authorizes the Minister of the Interior to 
issue decisions regulating the entry, residence and departure of the Palestinian refugees in Syria. In 1980, Ministerial Decision 
No.1531 was adopted in which procedures for issuing residence permits for Palestinians refugees in Syria was set. 
93 Legislative Decree No.37 of September 1949 exempted Palestinians from a provision of the Civil Servants Act that stipulated that 
unless one had been a Syrian national for at least five years, one could not serve in the Syrian civil service (Takkenberg 1998, 167).  
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considers them as though citizens in certain domains,94 and provides for travel documents95 and 
identity cards.96 Syrian law also expressly excludes the Palestinians from access to citizenship 
through naturalization, despite fulfilling the conditions set out by the law, in order to ‘preserve their 
original nationality’.97  
As for the second group, Syrian law distinguishes between those having obtained the citizenship of 
another state (such as most Palestinian refugees in Jordan) and those having refugee status in 
another state. The first sub-group are subjected to the law applicable for Arab nationals with 
regards to entry, stay, and exit,98 and with regards to work regulation.99  
Palestinian refugees who hold refugee status in another Arab country are obliged, if they wish to 
enter Syria, to obtain a visa prior to arrival. This visa is only granted with the approval of the 
relevant services. Those who are given a visa have no right to work in Syria unless they first obtain 
a permit from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work.100 Syria does not recognize Palestinian 
Authority issued travel documents, and refuses to grant visas, even for short stay, for residents of 
the Autonomous Areas under Palestinian Authority control (Arzt 1996, 48) (Akram and Goodwin-
Gill 2000/2001, 224).  
 
6. Economic and social rights of Palestinian refugees  
 
This section examines the regulation of Palestinian refugee rights to work, education, health, and 
property in host Arab states.101 A refugee’s daily life is affected by national laws and institutions. 
Economic and social well-being depends largely on what residency and civil rights they enjoy. 
                                               
94 According to Law No.260 of 10 January 1956, “Palestinians residing in Syria as of the state of the publication of this law are to be 
considered as originally Syrian in all things covered by the law and legally valid regulations connected with the right to employment, 
commerce, and national service, while preserving their original nationality” (Takkenberg 1998, 168). 
95 Decree no. 28/1960, issued by president Gamal Abdel-Nasser (then President of the United Arab Republic, between Egypt and 
Syria), granting Palestinians in Syria Palestinian travel documents. Law No.1311/1963 regulated the issuing of Syrian laissez-passer 
or travel documents to Palestinians residing in Syria, on condition that they were registered with GAPAR and held Syrian provisional 
identity cards. Law No.45/1975 concerning the regulation of Passports at entry and exit of Arab Syrians stipulates that it also applies 
to Palestinian refugees in Syria (article 14).  
96 Ministerial decision No.1531 of 6 September 1980 regulated the issuance of residency cards for Palestinian refugees (Saleh 
2005, 2). According to Article 2, the Palestinian refugee residency card is granted for those who entered Syria in 1948 and who were 
registered at the register of Immigration and Passports and at the registers of the Public Agency for Palestinian refugees, and for 
their children aged 10-18, with their legal representative or those whom the Ministry of Interior allows to register. 
97 Citizenship Law No. 276/1969.  
98 Ministerial Order No. 30, of 12 March 2007, concerning the entry, stay, and exit of Arab nationals allows Arab nationals to enter 
Syria without a visa for entry or transit. Registration at the register of travellers’ arrivals is sufficient, once entry or exit is stamped on 
the travel document (Article 1). Those Arab nationals who wish to stay in Syria for more than three months are obliged to present a 
demand for authorization from the Department of Immigration and Passports. Only Lebanese nationals have a longer period of stay 
without permit (six months, according to Article 2) while it is only 15 days for other foreign nationals (Article 3). Those who do not 
respect the conditions are considered irregular, but the order does not foresee any penalty. Article 7 states that the authorization of 
stay does not mean a work permit. A work permit for Arab nationals is granted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work.  
99 Two new orders were issued in 2005 by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work which regulates work for foreign nationals in Syria, 
and the conditions needed to obtain a permit. The decisions do not distinguish between foreign nationals and Arab nationals. Article 
1 of Order No. 2040 of 20 November 2005, indeed, stipulates that "non-Arab Syrian" refers to all those who do not enjoy Arab Syrian 
nationality, or those having a status similar to them, such as Palestinian refugees in Syria (Saleh 2007, 239). 
100 Palestinians having an Israeli Laissez-Passer or Passports are, in principle, forbidden from entering Syria. There is no confirmed 
information concerning the way entry of Palestinians holding a Palestinian Authority travel document is regulated.  
101 A disclaimer needs to be done here, as to the availability of data, and the continuous need of update. The collection of those 
legal texts was done during the preparation for the research on Palestinian refugees in host Arab states (Khalil 2009). I will update 
the data as much as information that was available to me during the research that followed the redaction of earlier report.  
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Legal restrictions with regards to naturalization, family unification, employment, property, housing, 
education, health care, and others add to their insecurity and instability.102 Unstable and insecure 
refugees become a major destabilizing factor for host countries and the region. These refugees are 
easily exposed to political manipulation, exploitation, and poverty.  
 
6.1 The right to work  
 
The work environment in contemporary societies is usually highly regulated and work policies are 
highly restrictive. The rationale for such policy is the protection of national interest. In this sense, 
Arab policies are no different from those of other states, including western democracies.  
Palestinian refugees, despite residence of many years, and for many, being born and raised in the 
host country, are treated as foreign nationals as regards work regulations. Some suffer even more 
restrictive measures, as they need to obtain a permit like other foreign nationals, but may need to 
satisfy a ‘reciprocity of treatment’ clause, which is impossible for stateless Palestinians. What is 
more, Palestinian refugees, even if they surmount the hurdle of obtaining a permit, do not 
necessarily benefit from social security, though they make social security contributions. In 
Lebanon, for example,103 the right to social security for Palestinians is dependent on the reciprocity 
of treatment (Sayigh 1995, 44; Suleiman 2006, 16).104   
Labor laws in Arab states distinguish between ‘nationals’ and ‘foreigners’ as regards equal 
opportunities and benefits. In most Arab states, Palestinian refugees are treated as non-nationals, 
and therefore need work permits. Work permits for Palestinians are more or less difficult to obtain, 
depending on the state and the political environment. In the 1990s, following the Gulf crisis, most 
Arab states had restrictions as regards Palestinians. Restrictions, accompanied by stagnant 
economies, led to a high incidence of unemployment among Palestinians (Shiblak 1996, 43). Some 
Palestinians opted to profit from UNRWA work opportunities, but others migrated to third countries, 
looking for work abroad, mainly in the Gulf States (Yasin 1999). Those who remained in host 
countries resolved to work illegally, without protections. 
 
                                               
102 In Lebanon, for example, legal constrains and restrictive policies contributed to the exclusion of Palestinian refugees from the 
Lebanese labour market. This situation contributed to the deterioration of their socioeconomic situation, pushing some of them to 
leave (the out-migration within Palestinian refugees of Lebanon is indeed higher than that of other host countries, (Hanssen-Bauer 
and Jacobsen 2003, 4)) try to leave the country, while others remain in Lebanon, largely leaving school and performing poorly, with 
little ambition for the future (Å. A. Tiltnes 2005, 10). The illiteracy level among Palestinian refugees is almost as higher (almost twice 
as high) than the average of adult illiteracy among Lebanese nationals. If compared to other refugee camps in host countries, the 
literacy rate in refugee camps of Lebanon is 10% lower than that of Syria and Lebanon (Å. A. Tiltnes 2005, 15). It is very indicative 
that the highest proportion of poor camp refugees is found in Lebanon (35 percent) and the lowest in Syria (17 percent) (Jacobsen 
2000, 41).  
103 The Lebanese Social Security Law limits access to social security for foreign workers on the condition of reciprocity of treatment, 
meaning that the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees are excluded because they are simply stateless, and reciprocity of 
treatment is in fact impossible. Article 9(4) of the Social Security Law states: Foreign Labourers working on Lebanese soil are not 
subject to the provisions of this law, and therefore not entitled to the benefits of any and all sections of Social Security, except if the 
country of their origin affords its Lebanese residents the same treatment as its own citizens with regard to Social Security.” Cited in: 
Amnesty International 2006, 10. 
104 Article 9 of the Social Security Law issued on 26 September 1963, defines the conditions of foreign wage-earners' eligibility for 
social security in Lebanon: ‘the said foreign wage-earners shall benefit from the provisions stipulated in the Social Security Law, 
provided they hold work permits in accordance with the laws and rules and regulations in force and provided that reciprocal 
treatment is afforded its own nationals where social security is concerned’ (Al-Natur 1997, 270). 
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Egypt 
In Egypt, a series of laws were passed in 1954 that allowed Palestinians to practise liberal 
professions under the same standards and regulations as Egyptians. According to Decree No. 
657/1989,105 Palestinians in possession of an Egyptian Travel Document, endorsed with a visa 
other than for a tourist, were formally exempted from the requirement that native workers be given 
priority for employment (Takkenberg 1998, 153). However, in the late 1970s regulations changed. 
Presidential Decrees No. 47 and 48, issued in July 1978, cancelled earlier decisions that treated 
Palestinians like Egyptians. The Ministry of Human Resources prohibited foreign nationals, 
including Palestinians, to work in trade unless they had been married to Egyptians for more than 
five years.  
Decree No. 43/1988 determined conditions for granting work permits to foreign nationals.106 The 
decree provides that special concessions are available to foreign nationals married to Egyptians. 
Further, anyone of undetermined nationality who has been continuously and permanently residing 
in Egypt for not less than 15 years should be given priority, as should political refugees who have a 
certificate from the Political Refugees Office of the President. Special considerations should also 
be given to foreign nationals who were born in Egypt, and who have remained continuously and 
permanently resident. Palestinian refugees legally residing in Egypt are not treated equally with 
citizens, but rather as foreigners. Accordingly, in order to work, they need permits issued by the 
concerned authorities. The permit requires presenting documents that demonstrate having been 
resident in Egypt for the previous five years and the type of residency permit requested.  
Egyptian Law No.66/1962 was issued to permit Palestinians to work in government and public-
sector jobs, and to be treated as nationals of the United Arab Republic. However, in 1978, law No. 
48 was adopted.  This stipulated that employment of Arab country nationals should be conducted 
on a reciprocal basis.107 This condition cannot be satisfied by stateless Palestinians.  
 
Jordan  
Jordanian Palestinians have the same rights as other citizens, while Palestinians holding 
temporary Jordanian passports are treated as foreign nationals. As ‘Gazans of Jordan’ are non-
citizens, they need official permission to work, and they can do so only in the private sector. Their 
residency status and their right to leave and to return depends largely on the whim of the Jordanian 
government (Akram and Goodwin-Gill 2000/2001, 223). 
                                               
105 Article 11, paragraph J. 
106 Article 1 provides that foreign nationals will not be allowed to work in Egypt until they have obtained a proper permit from the 
Office of Manpower and Training in the relevant Governorate. Article 3 provides that certain matters should be considered by the 
Manpower and Training Office before granting a foreigner a work permit. First the foreign national should not be competing with 
equally or better qualified persons of Egyptian nationality. Also the necessity for the economy of Egypt of the foreigner’s work should 
be considered, as should be the intended place of work’s need for such an employer. If the foreign national is a person working in a 
field where the Egyptian law provides regulation of employees as to skills and experience, the foreigner should comply with the 
necessary regulation. Also a foreign national born and permanently resident in Egypt should be given priority over a complete 
foreigner. Under Article 4, the number of foreign employees in any establishment may not exceed 10% of the total number 
employed. Exception may be made if it is in the interests of the Egyptian economy. Article 5 provides for certain fees to be charged. 
On the first application by any foreign national, 1000 LE is charged for foreigners and members of Arab countries. Monks and nuns 
practicing a religious activity within monasteries and convents and not performing services outside their religious institutions are also 
charged. On renewal, the fees are halved. Article 7 provides that the establishment employing foreigners must keep a register, 
containing the foreigner’s name, family name, nationality and date of birth. The register should also contain details of his or her 
work, qualifications, work permit number, date of issue and wages. 
107 Section 1, Article 16. 
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Palestinians who have Jordanian nationality have equal rights as citizens with regards to public 
services. However, according to some authors, Palestinians still suffer from discrimination, 
especially in employment in the public sector and representation in government (Said 2005, 351): 
they are denied equal political participation and subjected to subtle forms of discrimination (Shiblak 
2006).108 As for those holding temporary travel documents (Palestinians from the West Bank, or 
Gazans residing in Jordan109), these people are treated as foreigners, and access to public service 
is restricted.   
 
Lebanon 
A restrictive policy towards foreign nationals in general, and Palestinians in particular, exists in 
Lebanon. Legislative texts regulating the labor market do not address the issue of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, leaving the Palestinians in a legal limbo (Al-Natour 1997, 366). However, the 
work of Palestinians in Lebanon, as much as other foreign nationals, is subject to regulation 
included in Presidential Decree No. 17561 of 18/9/1964.110  A Palestinian willing to work in 
Lebanon must satisfy three conditions: firstly, the obtaining of a work permit,111 secondly, national 
preference,112 and thirdly, reciprocity of rights and obligations (Suleiman 2006, 15-16). As was the 
case with Egypt, the reciprocity clause disenfranchises stateless Palestinians (IFHR 2003, 13).  
According to Article 9 of the decree, the Minister of Labor is entitled to enumerate and list jobs and 
trades that are restricted to Lebanese nationals, and to update that list in line according to the 
needs of the Lebanese labor market, a power often used by concerned ministers (Al-Natour 1997, 
366-371; IFHR 2003, 13; Suleiman 2006, 16-17).  For example:  
- Ministerial Decree No. 621/1 of 1995 (updating Ministerial Decision No. 1/289 of 18 December 
1982) enumerated a list of about 50 jobs, trades, and independent professions in the private 
sector that would prefer nationals. Jobs not mentioned in the decree require permits. 
Palestinian refugees are disadvantaged compared to Lebanese nationals, and, in some cases, 
foreign nationals (such as Syrian workers, who do not need work permits).113  In certain cases, 
it is possible for foreign nationals to receive an exemption from the Minister (Article 2).114 
These cases include those with residence in Lebanon since birth, Lebanese origin, and who 
having been married to a Lebanese female for more than one year.  Palestinian refugees may 
enjoy such an exemption, but data shows a limited number of permits issued for Palestinian 
                                               
108 Whether this discrimination is real, it is difficult to establish, because it is within the domain of the ‘informal politics.’ For sure, 
however, ‘Jordanians of Palestinian origins’ complain of systematic discrimination in favour of native Jordanians (Arzt 1996, 45).  
109 For more about Gazans in Jordan, see: El-Abed 2006. 
110 This author notices that there is confusion in the literature over this issue, concerning the act (law or decree) and the year. 
Suleiman 2006, 15), for example refer to it as ‘Decree No. 17561 of 18/9/1962’, (IFHR 2003, 12) refers to it as decree nº 17561 
dated July 10, 1962, while (Al-Natour 1997, 366-371) refer to it as Law No. 17561 of 18 September 1964. The local researcher 
refers to it as: Decree No. 17561 du 18/09/1964. The confusion is mainly between Law No.319 of 10 July 1962 (Law Regarding 
Entry to, Residency in and Exit from Lebanon) which imposes on foreigners wishing to work in Lebanon a license from the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs (Al-Natour 1997, 366). While Presidential Decree No.17561 of 1964 regulated the way that such a 
permit for foreign nationals is granted. Palestine Studies Organization published the Memorandum of 2005, in which reference is 
made to ‘Presidential Decree (marsoum) No.17561 issued in 18/9/1964, which this author adopts.  
111 Article 25 of the decree states that: ‘A foreigner, other than an artist, is prohibited from carrying in Lebanon any work or 
occupation unless permitted to do so by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs under valid laws and regulations’. According to 
Sayigh (1995, 44), granting a permit of work applied more or less harshly on Palestinians, depending on the politics of particular 
government and minister. In 1994, for example, only 100 work permits were granted to Palestinian refugees.  
112 Article 17 of the same decree directly refers to the national preference principle, as it states that: ‘The work permit shall be 
cancelled at any time, if it is revealed that any document is incorrect or as may be required in the interest of Lebanese labour’. 
113 No information available whither this is still currently the case or not.   
114 Article 2 is available at: http://www.humanrightslebanon.org/arabic/LLaw.html#FORG  
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refugees in Lebanon. According to Al-Natour, “[i]n principle, every Palestinian can obtain a 
work permit under these conditions. But for the vast majority of Palestinians in Lebanon, this 
principle is purely hypothetical and cannot be applied” (1997, 368).  
- On 27 June 2005, Ministry Memorandum No. 67/1 was issued, permitting Palestinian refugees 
who were born in Lebanon and registered with DAPR to work legally in manual and clerical 
jobs previously unavailable to them. However, the ban on Palestinians seeking professional 
employment has remained in place (Suleiman 2006, 15-18).115 The step was welcomed by 
organizations defending the rights of Palestinian refugees,116 since some obstacles to 
Palestinian work were removed. 
The public sector is not accessible to non-Lebanese nationals. However, Palestinians in Lebanon, 
as much as in Jordan and Syria, have access to jobs offered by UNRWA. In Lebanon, this has 
been possible since the exchange of communication between Lebanon and UNRWA in 1954.   
 
Syria 
In Syria, Palestinians who are deemed refugees according to Syrian law are treated as nationals, 
with regards to access to labour market in private and public sector. Other refugees need a visa of 
entry and need to work as other foreign workers.  
 
6.2 The right to education 
 
Egypt  
In Egypt, access of non-Egyptians to public schools is forbidden unless specifically provided for by 
law. Palestinian refugees’ children are foreign.  Accordingly, they have not been allowed to attend 
public schools since the early 1980s (Shiblak 1996, 43), and have to pay special fees in foreign 
currency to attend private schools. Despite obligations under international law for children, free 
access to primary education is secured exclusively for Egyptian citizens (Reeds 2006, 373). The 
situation is the same for universities, where non-Egyptians have to pay “foreigner fees”. Palestinian 
refugees are not allowed, in most circumstances, to join colleges of medicine, pharmacy, 
economics, political science, and journalism. However, over the years, two decrees have been 
adopted that exempt certain categories from the above rule, thus allowing foreign children into 
Egyptian public schools.  These include: 
- Decree No. 24, issued by the Minister of Education on 22 January 1992, exempted foreign 
nationals enumerated in the decree, including “Children of Palestinian and other workers in 
governmental or public sectors or armed forces in Egypt, and children of those among them 
who are retired.”  
- In 2000, the Minister of Education issued another Decree extending the application of the 1992 
Decree to other refugees (Grabska 2006, 20).  
                                               
115 The memorandum is available in Arabic at: http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/word/mdf/7517.doc  
116 Such as the Palestinian Commission for Refugees Rights Protection: http://www.hrinfo.net/palestine/pcrp/2005/pr0701.shtml 
(accessed on 11 September 2008).  
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Jordan 
In Jordan, the Ministry of Education announced in August 2006 that foreign children would no 
longer be allowed to attend either public or private schools in the Kingdom. Subsequently, the 
Ministry rescinded its ban and declared that they would be allowed to attend private schools and 
institutions. The decision was an improvement on the previous ban, but would make education for 
the children of poorer refugee families virtually impossible. The Ministry of Education will now allow 
children from Arab countries to enrol in the country’s public school system beginning in the 2006-
2007 academic year. The decision was based on the Ministry of the Interior’s recommendations, 
which specify groups of persons who will not be accepted in any school without the explicit 
approval of the Ministry of the Interior. These persons include holders of Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian, 
Lebanese, and Egyptian travel documents, holders of temporary Jordanian passports, and holders 
of Palestinian passports (Olwan 2007, 101). 
 
Lebanon 
According to Decree Law No. 820 of 5/9/1968, access to public schools in Lebanon is reserved for 
Lebanese nationals.117 However, it is possible to exceptionally accept foreign children, if there are 
free places.118 This restriction extends even to obligatory primary education.119  
Palestinian access to Lebanese public secondary schools is restricted (Sayigh 1995, 44; Arzt 1996, 
46). According to Al-Natour, at high or secondary school level, ten percent of places are reserved 
for foreign children, and Palestinians are eligible for these places (1997, 372). They may even 
receive limited financial assistance from UNRWA to study in such schools, or in private schools. 
The same rule applies for public universities. In practice, however, Palestinians would never be 
admitted to certain faculties in Lebanon.  
For this reason, most Palestinians study in the private sector, depending on financial means. Other 
educational institutions accessible for Palestinians are: UNRWA schools (for children from 6 until 
secondary school)120 and PLO institutions or NGOs for those less than six years of age and for 
secondary school. It should be noted that UNRWA has its own schools, which are generally found 
wherever there is a concentration of Palestinians, not only in camps (Al-Natour 1997, 372). In 
addition, given the difficulties young Palestinians encounter in getting a secondary education, 
UNRWA exceptionally operates five secondary schools in Lebanon. It also runs a program for 
university education funded by some UNRWA donors in the international community (Suleiman 
2006, 20). 
  
                                               
117 Article 3.  
118 Article 102. 
119 Law No. 686 of 1998, which amended Article 49 of Decree No.134/59 provides that: “Public education is free and compulsory in 
the primary phase, and is a right to every Lebanese in the primary education age.” Cited in: Amnesty International 2006, 11. 
120  Only children of registered Palestinians can enrol in the UNRWA’s 81 elementary and preparatory schools and 5 secondary 
schools that are available in Lebanon. It shall be noted that Lebanon is the only country within the UNRWA areas of operation, 
where UNRWA runs secondary schools (Amnesty International 2006, 12). Children of non-ID Palestinians can access private 
schools, but they need to be able to afford high fees. They cannot access secondary schools and most importantly cannot pass the 
official state exam (Amnesty International 2006, 12).  
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Syria 
As mentioned earlier, Syria grants Palestinians the same rights as Syrian citizens, and this applies 
to graduate and undergraduate studies.  However, some areas are left to the discretion of various 
government institutions. This is true of education where, according to Takkenberg, in keeping with 
the spirit of the law, elementary and preparatory education is provided for Palestinian refugees in 
UNRWA schools, while secondary education is provided in national schools (1998, 168). Syrian 
institutions and universities are open to Palestinians on equal terms to Syrians. A number of 
scholarships are available for Palestinians to study abroad  (Takkenberg 1998, 167-169). 
 
6.3 The right to health  
 
Egypt 
In Egypt, Palestinian refugees legally residing do not have access to medical care or the social 
benefits provided to Egyptian citizens (Reeds 2006, 373). In fact, as with regards to other 
governmental services, Palestinians are treated as foreign nationals under Egyptian national 
policies on health care. Recognized refugees are referred by UNHCR to Caritas, where they 
receive subsidized treatment. In February 2005, the Minister of Health issued a new regulation 
allowing access to public primary and preventive healthcare services for all foreign nationals 
residing in Egypt (Grabska 2006, 23). 
 
Jordan 
In Jordan, Palestinians who have obtained Jordanian nationality have the same rights as citizens, 
while others holding temporary Jordanian passports are treated as foreign nationals with regards to 
access to public health services.   
 
Lebanon 
In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees have no access to government hospitals (Sayigh 1995, 44; Arzt 
1996, 46) or other related health services. UNRWA, the Palestinian Red Cross Society (PRCS), 
and other NGOs are the main providers of health services for Palestinian refugees, though the care 
they provide is hardly adequate (Suleiman 2006, 20). Palestinian refugees legally residing in 
Lebanon receive no reimbursement for surgical operations from the Ministry of Health as Lebanese 
nationals do.  
 
Syria 
Palestinian refugees in Syria have the same rights as Syrian citizens with regards to access to 
health care.  
 
6.4 The right to housing and property 
 
In host states where refugee camps exist, strict and difficult procedures are in place with regards to 
re-building or renovating residence inside the camps or the issuance of permits for refugees 
residing therein. This is the case, for example, in Lebanon (Suleiman 2006, 18-19).  
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Egypt 
Since the early 1980s, new restrictions have been imposed on Palestinian refugees in Egypt with 
regards to their right to own property (Reeds 2006, 373). New regulations, with retroactive effect, 
ended previous ownership of agricultural land and those who owned land were required by law to 
terminate their rights within five years or face seizure of the land by the government (Shiblak 1996, 
44-45).  
 
Jordan 
Palestinians holding temporary passports in Jordan are subject to new regulations for buying 
property similar to those pertaining to foreign nationals.  
 
Lebanon 
In Lebanon, the freedom of foreign nationals to own property was regulated until 2001 by Decree 
No. 11614 of 14/1/1969 relating to the acquisition of immovable property for foreigners, which 
provides for special procedures121 and conditions (Suleiman 2006, 18-19). Accordingly, only in 
exceptional cases is it possible for Palestinian refugees legally residing in Lebanon to buy a 
personal residence, and the procedure is expensive and takes years (Shiblak 1996, 44-45).  
Restrictions targeting Palestinians with regards to the right to own property (outside refugee 
camps), came with the adoption of law No. 296 of 3 April 2001, which amended the first article of 
decree No. 11617 of 1969 regarding non-Lebanese acquisition of property (Elsayed-Ali 2006, 14; 
Said 2005, 353). It reads as follows: “[i]t is prohibited to any person who is not a national of a 
recognized state, or anyone whose ownership of property is contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to ‘Tawteen’ to acquire real-estate property of any kind.” This law was deemed 
constitutional by the Lebanese Constitutional Council (LCC), which argued that the new legislation 
safeguarded what it called the ‘supreme interest’ (Suleiman 2006, 18-19; Diab 2008, 3). This 
decision was criticized by the International Federation for Human Rights since it encourages the 
State to pass measures affecting Human Rights (2003, 13-14). 
 
Syria 
Even in Syria, where Palestinian refugees in principle enjoy full residency rights, restrictions were 
imposed preventing them from owning property except for a personal residence, and even then 
only after following certain procedures (Jarrad 1999; Shiblak 1996, 44-45). Palestinian refugees 
are also banned from purchasing arable land (As-Sahly 1999; Said 2005, 352).  
 
7. Possible impact of the global financial crisis 
 
                                               
121 As per Article 9 of Decree No. 11614/1969, non-Lebanese foreigners (including Palestinians) need to file an application for a 
license with the Minister of Finance, who in turn transfers it, along with his recommendation, to the Council of Ministers of the 
Cabinet. The Cabinet may then grant the license through a decree. The power of the Cabinet to grant or refuse the license is final 
and its decisions are not subject to any appeal (Al-Natour 1997, 372).  
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What began as a global financial crisis is rapidly turning into a global human rights crisis. The 
estimation of the number of malnourished people has risen (World Bank 2008, 1), as has infant 
mortality (UNESCO 2009). The financial crisis also means the loss of millions of jobs (ILO 2008; 
2009). This means a decline in remittances and a loss of homes and savings (Saiz 2009, 279). It 
also means increased poverty, which obliges people to lower the quantity and quality of their diet 
(Saiz 2009, 279). This situation may cause a fall in tax revenues, and thus will threaten to reduce 
the already meager funds devoted to social protection programmes in many developing countries, 
depriving the unemployed, sick, and elderly of essential safety nets (ILO 2008; Saiz 2009, 279). 
The financial crisis affects education and the training opportunities, and school attendance will drop 
(ILO 2008, 9). In particular the right of education for girls is threatened (Saiz 2009, 279).  
However, there are serious grounds to believe that the global financial crisis may be particularly felt 
by Palestinian refugees. Two main areas of risk may be outlined. The first is related to UNRWA, 
already under attack for perpetuating Palestinian refugeehood. While depending on international 
funds, UNRWA is faces serious risk because many countries are decreasing their funding due to 
the economic crisis, while others work to discredit the organization and argue for using 
international funds for refugee resettlement programs instead of financing UNRWA.122 The second 
impact is on entitlements of rights in host countries, already increasingly hostile to the presence of 
Palestinian refugees (or at least hostile to accommodating increasing numbers of them) on their 
borders from Iraq or in Gulf countries.  
 
7.1. Weakened UNRWA  
 
The attack on Palestinian exceptionalism and the differentiation between UN agencies dealing with 
refugees (UNHCR vs. UNRWA), is increasingly under attack (Kagan 2009). The reasons behind 
this attack are varied. Most importantly, attacks often agree on the premises (that something is 
wrong with the current situation) but disagree on the prescriptions to deal with the deficiencies and 
the gaps that are existent in current protection and assistance mechanisms.  
I regroup the approaches as follows: firstly, some may attack this exceptionalism arguing that 
UNRWA and host Arab states contribute to the perpetuation of the issue of Palestinian 
refugeehood, and they need to be dealt with the same way as any other refugees in the world, and 
dealt with by regular UN mechanisms dealing with refugees;123 secondly, some may attack this 
exceptionalism based on concerns for the socioeconomic welfare of Palestinian refugees in host 
Arab states, which is often correlated to the absence of protection mechanisms and restrictions of 
their rights and freedoms by host countries.  
This paper subscribes entirely to the second approach. This clarification is important because, 
despite the apparent similarity between both approaches in that they reject the current status quo, 
the difference between them is immense, and the conclusions they reach go towards completely 
                                               
122 The decline in aid is felt on the refugees of host countries much earlier than that; in fact, the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority and Oslo process in general resulted the “skewing of international funds away from the “outside” refugees” (Sayigh 1995, 
51). 
123 Rex Brynen summarized the reasons behind this attach, in a speech in the 60th anniversary of UNRWA in Columbia: “[T]he 
Agency frequently finds itself under political attack. Some have accused it of artificially keeping the refugee issue alive, or 
perpetuating refugee camps and failing to integrate the refugees into host populations. It has been accused of hiring terrorists, of 
failing to monitor and supervise the political views of its employees” (Brynen 2009, 4).  
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different directions. The first is the one held by Israel,124 and largely by pro-Israel scholarship.125 
The second approach is the one held by most international human rights organizations, and by an 
increasing number of scholars.126  
For those who subscribe to the first approach, any occasion is good to attack UNRWA, as much as 
host countries, urging the international community to cut its funding for refugees and concentrate 
on programs aimed at resettling Palestinian refugees. Those who subscribe to the second 
approach, while recognizing the uniqueness of Palestinian refugee issue, may stress that refugee 
law can be a useful tool for improving the situation. In other words, their uniqueness does not in 
any way negate the relevance of international refugee law to the Palestinian case (Kagan 2009, 
428). 
Besides, UNRWA’s role is recognized in avoiding a worse situation, and its role in responding to 
emergency needs is essential (Brynen 2009, 6).127 In this perspective, despite existing restrictions 
in law or national policy, the second approach recognizes the valuable assistance provided by host 
countries to Palestinian refugee populations in general, which need to be maintained and 
encouraged.128  
The point this approach is stresses, I believe, is not that UNRWA is not necessary or that 
Palestinian refugeehood is not unique and special, but rather that UNRWA is not currently capable 
of ensuring necessary protection for Palestinian refugees,129 and that host Arab states cannot use 
                                               
124 This explains the recent interest in the Israeli Knesset where a cross-party parliamentary caucus was formed to deal with the 
rehabilitation of Palestinian refugees in 2008. See report published in The Jerusalem Post: (Lefkovits 30 July 2008, retracted by 
LexisNexis).  
125 As pointed out by Kagan:  “Pro-Israel critics have argued for UNHCR to replace UNRWA because UNHCR’s refugee definition 
would supposedly reduce the official size of the Palestinian refugee population, and thus lessen the strength of Palestinian claims 
against Israel... These critics generally argue that UNRWA’s existence prolongs the Palestinian refugee problem by reinforcing 
Palestinian refugees’ separate identity, by failing to seek a solution to the refugee problem via resettlement of the refugees outside 
Israel, and for highlighting the claims of the refugees by virtue of its mere existence...” (2009, 427; Citations omitted).  
126 I will cite some of them in the coming paragraphs as much as in various parts of this report.  
127 Some have pointed out that the situation in refugee camps in host countries, although relatively worse in terms of poverty, if 
compared to other parts of the territory, they do not constitute the main poverty problem of the host countries. The main explanation 
they provide is often connected to the support from and situation within the host countries, and assistance from the international 
community mainly through the UNRWA (Hanssen-Bauer and Jacobsen 2003, 1). 
128 The best way to summarize Arab states positive contribution can be found in a recent speech that Susan Akram presented on 
the occasion of 60th anniversary of UNRWA: “The Arab states are frequently subjected to harsh criticism for their treatment of 
millions of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons, pointing to widespread violations of rights, and particularly to the failure to 
offer Palestinians permanent status in their territories. Indeed, much of the criticism has merit, in that the Arab states have often not 
respected individual rights of Palestinians as guaranteed in the principal human rights treaties and the customary norms those 
treaties embody. However, the critique that Arab states have failed to grant Palestinians permanent status in their territories is 
seriously misplaced: it ignores the fact that Arab states are under no legal obligation to grant permanent status to Palestinian 
refugees. In fact, Arab states have actually supported what the refugees themselves have demanded all along—the right to choose 
their durable solution, the right to return to their original lands and homes. It is my contention that the Arab states’ six decades of de 
facto temporary protection to the Palestinians is unprecedented in the history of protection of refugees, and has been granted at 
great social, economic and political cost. The Western world’s periodic and time-limited temporary protection programs have never 
reached the scale of generosity that the Arab states have shown the Palestinians” (Akram 2009, 1). 
129 The issue at stake here is that UNRWA is not enough, but the alternative is not the replacement of UNRWA by UNHCR, rather 
the enhancement of the protection role of UNRWA, or the extension of protection mandate of UNHCR to Palestinian refugees 
besides (not instead) existing agencies dealing with Palestinian refugees. UNHCR seem to be attractive for Palestinians in some 
issues, but it may be resisted and rejected for others. As pointed out by Kagan: “The attraction for Palestinians is that general 
refugee policy as advocated by UNHCR promotes three things that have been denied them: first, a clear recognition of the right to 
return, along with its complementary rights of property restitution; second, a clear goal of finding a durable solution, with particular 
emphasis on repatriation; third, a commitment to fundamental rights in exile until a durable solution can be found” (Kagan 2009, 
434). Then he add: “Yet it is important to recall that pro-Israel writers who are hostile to Palestinian aspirations are similarly 
questioning the wisdom of Palestinian exceptionalism because they believe that UNHCR involvement will help minimize the claims 
of Palestinian refugees. While general (i.e. non-Palestinian) refugee policy contains several attractions for Palestinians, it also 
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the uniqueness of Palestinian refugeehood to continue upholding discriminatory laws and policies 
towards Palestinian refugees. The best way to describe the second approach can be summarized 
by a quote from Rex Brynen on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of UNRWA: “happy 60th 
anniversary, UNRWA. I wish you were unnecessary — that issues of refugees and peace had long 
ago been resolved. Until they are, however, the Agency, its staff, and their very hard work remain 
invaluable.” (Brynen 2010). 
The global financial crisis may result in decreasing international funds to UNRWA, and UNRWA 
may be pushed towards reducing its services. Such a scenario will be felt by Palestinian refugees 
in particular ways, seeing the absence of alternative sources of income and the restrictive laws and 
policies that exist in some host countries. UNRWA is a main service provider for Palestinian 
refugees in host countries. It provides jobs for thousands of refugees, education, health care, and 
various other services that are extremely valuable and necessary. The argument I make here is 
simple: I do not argue that UNRWA is not necessary; rather I argue that it is not enough. The 
adoption of a protection role by UNRWA needs to be encouraged.130 In the same vein, the changes 
in UNHCR attitude towards certain groups of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, whether in 
providing valuable contribution of counting the refugees (not only those registered with UNRWA) in 
their various reports, and by extending protection to Palestinians who have fled Iraq, need to be 
supported (Kagan 2009, 431-433).  
 
7.2. Weakened Rights  
 
Being a Palestinian refugee is completely dependent on host state recognition of being so. It is a 
positive construction of the state, not the state of being a refugee. Arab states generally grant 
residency permits to Palestinian refugees. However, residency status varies from state to state 
(Badil 2007, 126). Palestinians in Egypt and Lebanon, who satisfy certain conditions with regards 
to entry and stay, obtain residency permits according to the regulation applicable on foreign 
nationals. In Syria, Palestinian refugees are granted standard national treatment, while in Jordan 
most have Jordanian citizenship.  
Granting residency status to those recognized as refugees means, at times, excluding the 
applicability of basic human rights to both recognized and unrecognized groups, but especially 
                                                                                                                                            
contains some hidden features that might challenge longstanding Palestinian political orientations. Two examples illustrate this 
point. First, established norms of refugee law would condemn the militarization of refugee camps (EXCOM 2002: Para. A) which has 
been a prominent feature of Palestinian armed conflict with Israel from the 1950s onwards. General refugee policy would thus back 
condemnation of groups like Hamas, and would call on host governments like Lebanon to disarm militant elements in refugee 
camps. Second, while it is true that refugee law generally backs the right of return and the right to property restitution. .., UNHCR’s 
approach to durable solutions is ultimately more pragmatic and flexible than many Palestinians might like. While UNHCR calls 
repatriation ‘the solution of choice’ for most refugees. .., it cautions that ‘there is no hierarchy of durable solutions’ and that 
resettlement and local integration should be considered simultaneously ... What this means in practical terms is that UNHCR will 
look to local integration and third country resettlement when repatriation is impossible (ibid.). UNHCR has indicated a similar flexible 
or ad hoc approach to compromises on property restitution... Thus, while UNHCR policy would back Palestinians on the abstract 
rights to return and restitution, in terms of implementation UNHCR might accept Israeli resistance as an immovable fact and turn 
pragmatically to other options in order to not leave refugees in limbo indefinitely” (Kagan 2009, 434; Citations omitted).  
130 As pointed out by Karen AbuZayd in a statement as UNRWA Commissioner-General, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of 
UNRWA: “The environment of persistent conflict and its impact on civilians – especially in the occupied Palestinian territory - have 
brought to the fore UNRWA’s protection role. Since the 2004 Geneva Conference, we have adopted a more forthright posture on 
protection issues, taking as our cue the duty to advance respect for the human rights of Palestine refugees which is implicit in 
UNRWA’s mandate.”   
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those living in ‘illegality’ within host states or those who do not satisfy the conditions imposed by 
law to be considered a refugee. Illegality and lack of refugee status means limited and 
disadvantaged access to jobs, lack of access to education for children, lack of access to health 
services, and inability to claim other rights, including the right to freedom of movement. This is the 
case of the undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon.131 This population suffers restrictions in all 
movement within the country. They cannot register their children,132 thus children cannot attend 
public schools. They cannot even register their marriages, being under constant threat of 
deportation (Shiblak 1996, 40; Takkenberg 1998, 163-164; Elsayed-Ali 2006, 14). An 
undocumented Palestinian is legally inexistent. When one does not exist, rights and freedoms are 
superfluous and useless concepts.  
Granting residency status to Palestinian refugees means, in practice, being granted certain 
privileges and/or restrictions by host states that can be called ‘rights’. Those are not, however, 
rights in the sense of legal obligations for host states, nor are they to be considered entitlements, 
but rather gifts or grants, a faculty to do or not to do, according to changes in politics and interests. 
Most Arab states do not consider it necessary to have a unique legal document that would govern 
the rights of refugees in Arab countries (Grabska 2006, 17). This applies acutely to Palestinian 
refugees.133 The fact is that most regulation related to Palestinian refugees in host Arab countries 
(especially in Egypt and Lebanon) is regulation by decrees and is left to the discretion of 
administrative authorities. This renders the situation of Palestinian refugees more fragile and easily 
dependent on changes in political contingencies.134  
In previous section I have outlined the available legal texts dealing with Palestinian refugees in 
host countries. I have constructed what I have called a legal matrix, where each Palestinian is 
treated according to his status, largely determined by host countries unilaterally. I have done this 
while pointing out the protection gap, whether in international and regional mechanisms.  
This was not done to argue that there is necessarily and irrefutably a direct correlation between the 
legal status and rights enjoyment of Palestinian refugees in host Arab states, on the one side, and 
their real economic and social welfare on the other. It also does not mean that legal status and 
legal rights are the only factors that determine the conditions of live for Palestinian refugees in host 
countries.135 On the contrary, there is often a correlation between the socioeconomic conditions of 
Palestinian refugees in host Arab countries and that of the rest of the population, at least for 
refugee populations living outside the refugee camps (Hanssen-Bauer and Jacobsen 2003, 4).   
                                               
131 There number, although not definitively sure, may be 3.000 to 5.000 individuals whose status in Lebanon is akin to that of 
irregular migrants, despite most of them having lived there for decades. As they do not possess valid identification they suffer from 
wide-ranging restrictions on their human rights (Elsayed-Ali 2006, 13). For more about needs and assistance to non-ID Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, cf Petrigh 2006, 15-16. 
132 According to Amnesty International, “children neither receive recognized identity documents from the Lebanese state” (2006, 10). 
133 According to Sayigh (1995, 44) “Lebanon as ‘host’ country always has been characterized by the absence of a legal code 
regulating refugee rights and obligations, the absence of rights except those of residence as refugees, regulation through ad hoc 
decrees, lack of legal protection against preventive detention, and obstacles to receiving necessary documents.”  
134 Most importantly, what follows will deal with the legal status and legal entitlements while being aware of the existent gap between 
the law on the books and the law in practice or in the real life, that may need a different kind of analysis and empirical data in 
support or against what follows. 
135 In Jordan for example, it was outline by many reports (see for example: Arneberg 1997; Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002) that there are 
clear differences between Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps and Palestinian refugees who are living in the rest of the 
country. Regardless of the reasons behind such differences, what is important is to notice that the situation of Palestinian refugees 
in host Arab countries needs to be looked at with attention to those existent differences and that legal status is not the only factor 
that has impact on Palestinian refugees welfare conditions in host countries.  
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Nevertheless, some data concerning the economic and social situation of Palestinian refugees in 
host states are explicable if placed in the context of their legal status and rights distribution.136 The 
suggestion here is that the welfare status of Palestinian refugees in host Arab states is strictly 
connected to their legal entitlements, their rights and freedoms. There is a high risk here of 
simplification, by suggesting to connect, in abstract, legal rights and concrete conditions of welfare. 
This is not my objective. Rather, I intended to show how certain legal provisions, in force in host 
Arab states, or the lack of other legal provisions, contribute to the deterioration of welfare status. 
Said differently, if it is not possible to confirm (at least with the methodological tools that this author 
applies in this research) that the deterioration of economic, social, and cultural welfare is due 
(partially or totally) to this or that legal provision or its absence, it is, nonetheless, possible to 
confirm without hesitation that certain legal provisions and the lack of others constitutes a real 
obstacle towards full realization of Palestinian refugee welfare.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
More than six decades after displacement, assistance and protection of Palestinian refugees in 
host Arab states is still needed. Their right to return is yet to be realized, and statelessness is still a 
destabilizing factor in the region. International aid, even in a time of global financial crisis, needs to 
be maintained, not out of charity but out of responsibility. As pointed out by Saiz, “[t]hat 
international assistance is an obligation, not an act of charity, must be emphasized in a context 
where the costs of the economic crisis are being borne disproportionately in the south, despite 
having originated in the richer countries” (2009, 288).  
Most importantly in the Palestinian case, it is partially the responsibility of the international 
community, which partitioned Palestine, has yet to establish a Palestinian state, and has not 
enforced the many resolutions related to the right of return for Palestinian refugees. In this context 
it is possible to perceive assistance as a form of protection. Whenever assistance is effectuated as 
to fulfill a legal obligation, it may be considered as comprising part of a protection mechanism. 
Assistance as protection is not conceived as an act of charity aiming at providing superfluous 
resources to refugees in need. Rather, it is conceived as an obligation of host states, as much as 
of the international community. Accordingly, they are responsible for fulfillment, and, falling short, 
they risk being rendered accountable and responsible. In this sense, the basis for state action is 
not dependent on refugee need or state resources, but rather on individual entitlements to rights.137  
                                               
136 The increased poverty among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can be cited as an example. For (Arzt 1996, 46) “Around 60 
percent of the Palestinians in Lebanon live below the U.N. poverty line, making it the poorest of the communities in the UNRWA 
orbit.” According to Said (2005, 354), “[t]he legal situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon explains in part why an estimated 
80% live in poverty… The rise in poverty has also created a health crisis, as Palestinians are not allowed access to Lebanese 
government hospitals and other health services.” Restrictive policies and laws in host country, such as in Lebanon, add to their 
preoccupations new ones, including the daily life problems arising from the “lack of housing, lack of jobs, decline in aid, and 
environmental deterioration. More serious is the pervasive anxiety caused by uncertainty about the future and the “campaigns of 
hatred” that erupt whenever the question of Palestinian naturalization or tawtin arises” (Sayigh 1995, 52).  In support to this claim, I 
can cite also a report issued by Fafo, related to Palestinian refugees in Syria, in which it was stated that the living conditions of 
Palestinian refugees in Syria are basically on a par with those of Syrian citizens. The same report connects this reality with the 
existing equality of rights between Palestinian refugees and citizens (Tiltnes 2006, 9).  
137 Although rights and needs may seem similar as to the way they may be satisfied, the approach is completely different, as much 
as the consequences. A rights-based approach enhances the need to take the rights of refugees seriously and not only their needs. 
The essence of a rights-based approach is the identification of a certain standard of treatment to which an individual refugee is 
entitled. In addition, rights imply justiciability, i.e. the ability to access and claim justice. It takes us one step further and prompts 
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The way assistance is provided to the Palestinians, including UNRWA shortcomings, intentions to 
reduce services, the lack of resources and funds, and the diminution of contributions from 
international community, as much as the way some host countries are (or are not) providing 
assistance to Palestinian refugees, including refusal to admit them to public schools, hospitals, and 
other state services, proves that assistance is not conceived as a legal obligation. This is one 
reason why assisting Palestinian refugees for decades has not contributed to Palestinian refugee 
empowerment and welfare or economic, social, and political development. This is why assistance 
is provided for Palestinians while maintaining refugee camps, as if refugeehood and economic 
instability and precariousness are two faces of the same coin.138  
Protection, however, entails much more than assistance. It entails taking refugee rights seriously. 
This paper has shown that the way host Arab countries deal with Palestinian refugees is shaky and 
unstable, and easily manipulated in times of crises to respond to internal, regional, or international 
contingencies.   
Precarious legal recognition of economic and social rights, accompanied by a lack of political 
enforcement, renders Palestinian refugees easy prey for the consequences of the global financial 
crisis, and an easy target for recession actions undertaken by concerned governments. The 
economic crisis may provide a ‘good opportunity’ to justify rejection of legal obligations to recognize 
economic and social rights, since legal recognition has serious consequences, not only in 
economic and political terms, but also in legal terms. Besides, the financial crisis provides a much-
awaited opportunity for concerned states to escape fulfillment of their political commitments 
towards the enforcement of economic and social rights, “a further license to ignore their economic 
and social rights obligations” (Saiz 2009, 280). A more optimistic vision of the current crisis may 
see in it a potential opportunity to bridge the gap between legal justiciability and political 
accountability. The challenge would be to translate the abstract normative principles of 
international law into an ethical point of reference in the political arena and make them operational 
in day-to-day public policy making (Saiz 2009, 281). 
In this paper, the vision is, admittedly, pessimistic. The global financial crisis may have direct and 
indirect consequences on Palestinian refugees. The little available literature on the topic suggests 
that, at least with regard to political enforcement of economic and social rights, there is a real 
danger of regression. Based on historical experience, this paper suggests, there are serious 
grounds to believe that legal recognition of economic and social rights will be affected. It is possible 
to accept arguments in favor of delaying political enforcement because of financial and economic 
prerogatives, delimiting its application ad minima, or even deciding to prioritize certain actions over 
others. What is inconceivable to accept, from a human rights perspective, are compromises with 
regards to legal recognition.  
A right exists or does not exist. One cannot have both options. State actions aimed at delaying the 
legal recognition of economic and social rights, their delimitations, or their re-organization in a way 
that render those rights effectively non-existent, are intolerable and unjustifiable. None of the duties 
of host countries with regards to human rights are derogable as a result of the financial crisis.  
                                                                                                                                            
questions about responsibility and accountability, and provides a legal component that points to the institutional duty to protect, 
respect, fulfil and safeguard them (Grabska 2006, 10, 11) 
138 Here again there is a clear difference between host countries concerning the number of refugees who remain in refugee camps, 
where policies of host states have direct impact on the refugees decision to remain in the refugee camp or opt for living elsewhere in 
the host country. In Jordan for example, where 95% of Palestinian refugees have Jordanian citizenship (Arneberg 1997, 16), only 13 
percent actually live in UNRWA refugee camps. In general situation in camps are “worse off with regards to almost all aspects of 
what are considered relevant indicators of a good life” (Arneberg 1997, 7).  
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They are universally applicable to all states regardless of their level of resources or economic 
development.  
Deterioration in the global economic structure is therefore no justification for states – whatever their 
level of income – to compromise on fundamental human rights obligations. In such times it is all the 
more important that states guarantee minimum essential levels of these rights, take deliberate 
measures targeting the most vulnerable, avoid measures that are regressive or discriminatory, and 
orient public policy towards the progressive realization of the rights of the whole population through 
the equitable distribution of available resources (Saiz 2009, 283-284). 
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